THEATRE IN EUROPE I HAROLD CLURMAN

THE NATION

JUNE 19, 1967 35 cents

Upsala College Library
East Orange, N. J.

SMALL WARS: THE PERIL ESCALATES

SEYMOUR MELMAN

CLASS OF '67

THE GENTLE DESPERADOES

Harold Kaplan Karl Shapiro R.J. Kaufmann
Allan Seager J.A. Bryant, Jr. John R. Willingham
Lawrence Lipking Wallace Stegner

SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT III / KARL M. RUPPENTHAL

GAMES WITH SNOW WHITE / SHAUN O'CONNELL
THE NONPERSONALITY CULT / ALEXANDER WERTH
THE POLITICS OF ART / SHERMAN PAUL

12-18-67 CLB-1314
UPSALA COLLEGE LIBRARY
EAST ORANGE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LETTERS

boom

Cambridge, Mass.

DEAR SIRS: Karl M. Ruppenthal's articles on the proposed supersonic transport plane (SST), in *The Nation* of May 22 and May 29, bring out for the first time many of the serious shortcomings of the program. . . . Additional facts that Ruppenthal might have mentioned are: (1) When and if the SSTs are in routine use over the United States, the amount of damage their sonic booms may be expected to do to window glass, plaster, etc., is more than $1 million per day, according to a straightforward estimate based on Air Force and FAA reports on recent sonic boom tests at Chicago and St. Louis. (2) The FAA admits that there is no cure for the sonic boom. (3) It continues to refuse to ban supersonic flight over land. (4) It has no feasible plan whereby a homeowner can collect for damage done to his house.

William A. Shurcliff, Director,
Citizens League Against the Sonic Boom

Alan Swallow

San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR SIRS: The place of Alan Swallow in American letters is a proud one. As poet, critic, teacher, and one of the great individualistic publishers of the country, he will take his place in history as a man of many gifts. In a time of growing conformity, when committees of editors are the rule in most publications and publishing houses, he remained the champion of individual taste and choice. One could disagree with him, but one had always to respect his judgment and integrity. Starting with his own hand press, he built up a large publishing business with a remarkable and varied group of writers. His untimely death occurred as he was receiving ever wider recognition of his achievements as a writer, editor and publisher. Those of us who published with him and knew him as a friend will miss him greatly. We hope that the means will be found to continue his rare and unique publishing venture as a memorial to him, and we pledge ourselves to help in any way that we can.

Mark Harris Hester G. Storm Richard McBride James Schevill Alvaro Cardona-Hine Walter Van Tilburg Clark Thomas McGrath Jack Beeching Richard Lyons Allen Tate Allen Planz J. V. Cunningham Natalie S. Robins Frank Waters Howard Baker Kay Boyle Yvor Winters Janet Lewis Vincent McHugh Harvey Shapiro Anais Nin Roger Hecht Martin Robbins Frederick Manfred Gus Blaisdell.

don't forget

Berkeley, Calif.

DEAR SIRS: This coming summer . . . there will be mass migration of young Americans and some foreign youth to the San Francisco-East Bay area. . . . Many of these will be people of draft age. We are to be witness to a vast, artificial grouping of draft-age men, assembling under the eyes of those who are responsible for filling Johnson's war quotas. Now how long do you think it will be before the local police and federal agents start having sidewalk- and street-blocks, stopping all young "rebel" types and demanding to see the sacred draft card?

You all recall reading at least a line or two in your American History text about the Civil War Draft Riots. And do you remember that in New York and other cities many men—often Irish and immigrants just escaped from Europe's armies—fought armed gun battles with the state's agent, sometimes for weeks at a time?

That's all. *Joseph E. Fasciani*

EDITORIALS

The Great De-Mythification

The military victory of Israel in the Middle East no only confronted the amazed world with a fantastically successful blitzkrieg but also punctured irreparably, in forty-eight hours, three carefully nurtured myths of international life: the image of President Nasser as the leader of the Arab world (which he had hoped to refurbish with the bold blockade of Aqaba), the presen capability of the Arab nations to encircle and strangle Israel and, perhaps most important, the effective solidarity of the Soviet Union with the Arab countries in their struggle against Israel as a "tool of Western imperialism."

The upheavals created by the collapse of the first two of these grand illusions are yet to take shape and are primarily a matter of regional concern. Of more immediate interest is the fact that the UN Security Council was the stage for the toppling of the Soviet Union from its posture of champion of the Arab peoples. Ironically, this dramatic event was the only visible result of the intense activity around the Council's chamber, while the fate of the war was being decided solely on the field of battle It was an obligation for the Security Council to go through the motions of calling for a cease-fire, although most diplomats were convinced that Israel would not heed such a call until it had obtained guarantees for its survival Yet even this academic attempt was frustrated in the early stages by the opposing views of the United States and the Soviet Union. Washington wanted an unconditional cease-fire resolution; Moscow insisted on a clause calling for withdrawal of the Israeli forces to the positions they held before the 5th of June—that is, their abandonment of newly occupied Egyptian territory.

The only interest of this sterile exercise was to demonstrate once more that in the absence of agreement between the United States and the USSR the United Nations is powerless to assume even a purely formal role in peace keeping. The impasse was total and the Council's well meant agitation empty to the point of being ludicrous All of a sudden, while the columns of General Dayan raced through the Sinai, the situation changed. It became clear to the Soviet Union that it had miscalculated, that the expensive armaments it had supplied to Nasser over the last few years lay destroyed on the ground and that the USSR might be called upon to intervene directly. Attributing—not without grounds—a similar reasoning to Washington in case of serious difficulties for Israel, Moscow backed down.

Nikolai Fedorenko signed with Arthur Goldberg on the dotted line of a resolution which contained only a call for a cease-fire, without condemnation of Israel or any request for withdrawal. Israel, which had already reached its objectives, welcomed the resolution, but continued to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

press on. A few hours later, the Arabs accepted the resolution to save themselves from utter rout. Following its tradition of realism in foreign policy, the Soviet Government had chosen to limit a political commitment rather than engage in a military adventure, possibly against the United States.

Although the Kremlin warned Tel Aviv that it would break diplomatic relations with it and "take other measures" if Israel did not stop its "aggression," these threats must be a meager consolation to the United Arab Republic in its hour of need. Arab history books may well cite the Soviet defection as the "stab in the back" in this ill-fated episode, rather than the "attack" by American and British planes, which was obviously invented by Cairo in the heat of the moment as a desperate excuse for its military disaster.

This may well be the vanishing point of a Russian dream. Unless the Soviet Union changes its course again very soon (a most unlikely possibility), its steadily built foothold in the Middle East will be destroyed, its role as a protector of the nations recently freed from colonialism at an end, its financial and ideological investments bankrupted. A few weeks ago, the African nations denounced in the General Assembly the withdrawal of Soviet support for their plans for a confrontation with South Africa over the territory of South West Africa. The "grand disillusion" has now engulfed all of the Arab world.

ANNE WEILL-TUCKERMAN

What Double Standard?

Predictably, the hawk columnists and editorial writers, together with their coadjutors in the Johnson Administration, sensed a heaven-sent opportunity in the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East. One White House spokesman is supposed to have circulated an aphorism of his own making: "The doves on Vietnam are hawks in Israel." In eight words, he managed to distort the truth about as far as it can be twisted. Following his lead, or exercising their own considerable talents in that direction, the commentators let loose on the Vietnamese "doves" with a barrage of accusations of "inconsistency," "double standard," etc. At last they could go on the offensive.

Actually, nothing could be clearer than the unlikeness of the situations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In Vietnam the United States intervened gratuitously and, after failing to save Vietnam for French colonialism, sabotaged the Geneva accords and took over the war against the Vietnamese people. In the Middle East, Israel is a creation of the United Nations and, be it said to their credit, of Britain and the United States. Being responsible for its existence, the UN is surely responsible for its survival. This applies to the Soviet Union as well as the United States. The latter has recognized its obligation, verbally at least, while the Russians saw a chance to make trouble for us in an area close to their borders, as we

IN THIS ISSUE

June 19, 1967

EDITORIALS

770

ARTICLES

774 Small Wars: The Peril Escalates — *Seymour Melman*

775 Class of '67: The Gentle Desperadoes — *Harold Kaplan, R. J. Kaufmann, J. A. Bryant, Jr., Lawrence Lipking, Karl Shapiro, Allan Seager, John R. Willingham, Wallace Stegner*

781 Mao's Revolution: Keeping China Safe for Communism — *James R. Townsend*

786 Supersonic Transport III: Blind Stakes in the Poker Game — *Karl M. Ruppenthal*

BOOKS & THE ARTS

790 The Nonpersonality Cult — *Alexander Werth*

791 Music Over Words (poem) — *Richard Eberhart*

792 The Politics of Art — *Sherman Paul*

793 Visiting Italy (poem) — *Robert Bly*

794 Good, Dirty Fun and Games — *Shaun O'Connell*

795 An Affair of Passion — *George R. Stewart*

797 Theatre in Europe I — *Harold Clurman*

798 Responses (poem) — *Robert Hershon*

799 Crossword Puzzle — *Frank W. Lewis*

Publisher JAMES J. STORROW JR.
Associate Publisher GIFFORD PHILLIPS
Editor CAREY McWILLIAMS
Associate Editor PHIL KERBY
Executive Editor ROBERT HATCH
Literary Editor HELEN YGLESIAS
Copy Editor MARION HESS
Poetry Editor MICHAEL GOLDMAN
Theatre HAROLD CLURMAN
Washington ROBERT G. SHERRILL
Art MAX KOZLOFF
Paris ALEXANDER WERTH
Music BENJAMIN BORETZ
London RAYMOND WILLIAMS
Science CARL DREHER
Bonn C. AMERY
Advertising Manager MARY SIMON
Canberra C. P. FITZGERALD

The Nation is published weekly (except biweekly in July and August) by the Nation Magazine Company and copyright 1967 in the U.S.A. by the Nation Associates, Inc., 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10014. Tel.: CH 2-8400. West Coast office: 1256 Westwood Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif. 90024. Tel.: GR 4-2533. Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing office.

Subscription Price: One year, $10; two years, $18. Foreign and Canadian postage: $1 extra per year.

Change of Address: It is essential that subscribers ordering a change of address give four weeks' notice and provide their old as well as their new address. Please give Zip Code numbers for both addresses.

Information to Libraries: The Nation is indexed in Readers Guide to Periodical Literature, Book Review Digest, Book Review Index and the Public Affairs Information Service.

THE NATION
Combined with FRONTIER

Volume 204
No. 25

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had made trouble for them in Vietnam. However indefensible the Russian tactic may be, the UN-U.S. obligation is clear, the more so because the abrupt withdrawal of the UN forces gave Nasser the opportunity to precipitate the crisis.

To run out on the issues in Vietnam, to lessen the pressures to end that execrable war, as a *quid pro quo* to induce the Johnson Administration to take stronger action in the Middle East, would be morally despicable and politically stupid. Maurice N. Eisendrath, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, put the case forcefully last winter in a letter to President Johnson. ". . . great numbers of my fellow Jews in America," Rabbi Eisendrath wrote, "the greater number I do believe, will not sacrifice their moral convictions concerning the evils of this particular war in Vietnam to be at ease in Zion or in America."

The Flag-Burning Irritant

As several distinguished law professors testified before a House Judiciary Subcommittee early this month, flag burning is a statement of dissent, and any attempt to suppress the activity is a violation of the First Amendment's protection of free speech.

The anti-flag-burning legislation now passing through Congress (it would send to prison for a year anyone who "casts contempt upon any flag of the United States by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, or trampling upon it") is in reality a measure to stifle opposition to a particular war. If there was ever any doubt about that, it was blown away by an exchange between Congressman Byron Rogers of Colorado, chief sponsor of the bill, and Prof. Monroe H. Freedman of the George Washington University School of Law.

Freedman asked what national interest could justify the legislation.

> REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: There is such a thing as a little war going on in Vietnam, and I understand there has been a lot of shooting going on out in Israel this morning. Don't we have a national interest in that? . . .
>
> FREEDMAN: *The national interest in proscribing flag burning relates to the war and protest against the war?*
>
> ROGERS: *Yes, it does.*
>
> FREEDMAN: So that contempt to the flag is equated with protest against the war and protest against the war is equated with burning the flag with an intent to have contempt.

In another exchange Rogers argued that the President and Congress have the duty to put down such dissent and thereby "hold together the nation in time of peril." It is the dull, dangerous theory of victory through consensus for which the White House is now infamous.

An equally clear acknowledgment that the legislation is aimed at satisfying a political majority at the expense of constitutional guarantees came from Rep. Robert McClory, who replied, when asked by Prof. Herbert Reid of Howard University, what clear and present danger to the Republic calls for such action: "We are getting thousands of letters from people, even servicemen, about these flag burnings. Doesn't that call for action?"

Reid, a Negro, coolly noted: "I think that Congress is as powerless to reach [the irritant of flag burning] as it is to reach the Klan which met yesterday in Atlanta under the symbol of the American flag and called for a blood bath. As disastrous as that speech is, it is protected by the Constitution."

A few similarly cool voices are to be heard within Congress, but in the main it is beginning to sound like a convention of flag wavers. Rep. John Conyers of Detroit has led the defense of the First Amendment freedoms within the subcommittee, and he was joined by the old reliables, Don Edwards of California and Robert Kastenmeier of Wisconsin, in the full Judiciary Committee. They lost, of course, just as the constitutionalists will lose to the jingoists in both houses of Congress. But as long as many of the younger Congressmen who publicly support the bill admit privately their unease—as they are doing—there is at least hope that the nation is not quite ready to move on to the hysteria of total war.

A Fine Idea, If . . .

Somewhere in *Main Currents in American Thought* Vernon Louis Parrington lashed out with a memorable phrase: Science, he said, had been made a "drab and slut of industrialism." Parrington, like Thorstein Veblen, died in 1929. In the thirties, many would have blamed "capitalism" rather than "industrialism," on the theory that in the Soviet Union the evils of industrial civilization had been cured, or at least therapy was on the way. But after the passage of another thirty years neither the Soviet version of communism, nor the American version of capitalism, can claim superiority over the other in making science (which in the present context includes technology) serve the ends of human welfare. Each side may blame the other for the diversion of knowledge, resources and manpower to war and preparation for war, but neither has achieved minimal decency in international relations or in the treatment of its own citizens.

On both sides, humane and intelligent citizens have few illusions on that score. The Soviet novelist Daniel Granin views the world's problems from a standpoint far removed from the customary Soviet self-praise. As reported by M. S. Handler in *The New York Times* (May 7), Granin's is a "one world" viewpoint: he dares to use the term "cosmopolite" without disparagement. "It is precisely the anxieties, disasters and concerns for the future," he writes, "that further the unification of humanity," and cites, as problems that cannot be solved within the framework of one country, feeding the world's population, water supply, combating influenza, weather forecasting and control, radio communications, radio astronomy and the struggle against crop-damaging insects. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world must be regarded as "a unified organism," he declares. Here is Wendell Willkie brought up to date.

An echo comes from Stanford University. In mid-May, Prof. Robert C. North told a campus conference that the technological world is changing "right under our feet," and no ideology—Right, Left or Center—is taking proper cognizance of the issues or suggesting how these are to be met. He cites such problems as population control, armament control, communication satellites, the cybernetic revolution, the prolongation of life. He sees the Chinese "cultural revolution" as an attempt by Mao Tse-tung and his supporters to cope with the technological advances of the fifties and sixties on a basis analogous to the guerrilla tactics which brought communism to power in earlier decades.

A potentially important effort in this line is McGeorge Bundy's mission to the Soviet Union as a Presidential emissary without portfolio, interrupted for the time being by his call to Washington. His objective there will be to work out a plan for an international research institute to solve problems common to all highly industrialized societies. Cited are "urban sprawl, air and water pollution, transportation difficulties, and efforts to improve education, economic and industrial management, and the innovation process." If Bundy can eventually bring this off—presumably with an infusion of U.S. capitalist funds—it will be one of the most important projects the Ford Foundation has ever tackled. The premise is completely sound. Nor does the idea come out of the blue; the Pugwash conferences have set a precedent.

The "drab and slut of industrialism" cannot be made into a respectable creature under such auspices as our Vietnamese War or the Soviet support of Arab nationalism. These can only debauch her further. Yet Granin, North and Bundy have hold of a hopeful idea. One can only wish them well.

Power Blackouts and the FPC

On May 23, 1967, Sen. Lee Metcalf introduced two bills proposing to authorize the Federal Power Commission to regulate extra-high-voltage (EHV) transmission. On June 5, five major public utilities serving eastern Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware, and parts of Maryland had a power failure reminiscent of the historic blackout of November 9, 1965.

In introducing his bills, Senator Metcalf pointed out that similar legislation had been proposed in the 89th Congress by the late Sen. Clair Engle, and by Rep. John Moss in the House. He quoted FPC Commissioner Ross:

"Very bluntly, as most people in the power business realize, it is no longer the parties who control generation that control the industry—it is the parties who control the transmission, the arteries of the industry, that control the destiny of the millions of ratepayers of this nation."

As almost everyone knows by now, a consumer of electric power usually has no idea where his power comes from, nor does it always come from the same generating stations. He may be living next to a generating station, yet it may not be his principal source of supply. Today electric power is *pooled*. The utilities buy power from one another in accordance with supply and demand. The existence of power grids, in which such interchanges take place regularly, makes for economy and gives the utilities more leeway before the rate-making commissions. In theory, part of the savings should be passed on to the consumers, but practice does not necessarily follow theory.

The big point in favor of huge interstate networks is that they provide insurance against blackouts. Any one generating station may fail from a variety of causes and, when the load is heavy, plunge a whole system into trouble; but through the transmission lines the floundering system is supposed to be helped by its neighbors. And often it is, without the public's knowing anything about a possibly narrow escape from a serious outage. Yet, as the events of 1965 showed, this interlocking of power systems can itself be the cause of power failures, perhaps more widespread than they would have been without so much interconnection.

The basic trouble, however, is not with the power-pooling idea but with the way in which it is carried into operation. While there is always some degree of coordination among the member utilities of a grid, an intertie between two systems may be designed primarily for interchange between these two, and may have only the power-carrying capacity required for this particular transfer. It may be too weak for any larger purpose. If, in an emergency, it is overloaded, its circuit breakers trip, and the systems which depend on it for mutual support may go down in consequence.

The tie between Public Service of New Jersey and Consolidated Edison of New York is a case in point. In the 1965 blackout, with Con Edison completely out of commission, this line continued to serve a part of Brooklyn and, after many hours, helped to put Con Edison back on its feet. Had it been strong enough, it might have given PJM (Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland) support to Con Edison and averted the almost total blackout in New York City. In the June 5 incident, it is reported that Con Edison had excess generating capacity when the trouble began, but the circuit breakers on this tie operated. Con Edison was saved from possible involvement, but PJM received no help.

Legislation of the kind proposed by Senator Metcalf is obviously needed. The FPC should not be in the role of an interested observer; it should have authority to prescribe the building of adequate interconnections in the public interest. If interstate commerce in electric power is left largely to state regulatory bodies, the situation may become increasingly chaotic. The story is familiar: great potential advantages from technological innovation, only partly realized because of a lag in government policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Small Wars: The Peril Escalates

SEYMOUR MELMAN

Mr. Melman, professor of industrial engineering at Columbia University and participant in the Nation Institute's California Conference earlier this year, is the author most recently of The Depleted Society *(Dell).*

Before the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962, it seemed utopian to suggest that the United States and the Soviet Union could agree not to threaten nuclear war. But such an understanding was reached. The informal paths used for developing this understanding do not detract from the fact that since October, 1962, neither government has uttered nuclear war cries.

An agreement to agree was generated once both governments found it intolerable to continue the nuclear confrontation system for political settlements. The nuclear threat menaced the physical and economic security of each society so severely as to create an urgent problem for each side that could be solved acceptably only by joint agreement to avoid nuclear war.

Nevertheless, that agreement did not imply to the governments in Washington and Moscow that military violence was no longer a competent instrument of political power. Accordingly, fresh political and military ideologies, Eastern and Western, supported the idea that small wars between states, restricted to non-nuclear weapons and limited to particular territory, could still be workable propositions. Opposing ideologies of "national liberation" and "containment of communism by counterinsurgency" were given military expression in forces designed to fight and win with "conventional" weapons.

But there is no known way of designing a small war between states, whether of the Vietnamese or the Arab-Israeli type, which does not contain a significant potential for big-power involvement and hence nuclear confrontation. A succession of small wars necessarily heightens these risks. The difficulty of curtailing small wars, either in scope or intensity, goes far to explain why no war between states has been permitted to reach a military conclusion since World War II. Despite the readiness of large and small governments to use force as an international instrument of power (and the implied readiness to violate the United Nations Charter), each instance of international violence on a large scale since 1945 has provoked the fears of other countries who, in due course and acting separately or jointly or through the United Nations, intervened to curtail military operations.

Despite the divergent political assessments, the United States and the Soviet Union have been developing areas of common interest, as yet unformulated, against the incidence of small wars, and favoring agreement on ways of avoiding them. The factors generating such common interest include the following:

(a) Nuclear wars are now well appreciated as no-win operations for the nuclear powers.

(b) Hazards deriving from proliferation of nuclear weapons are a common concern for the United States and the USSR. Small states, unable to attain their own national security in other ways, seek to become nuclear powers. A non-nuclear Germany is more difficult to insure under such conditions.

(c) Military operations by small states are not reliably limited to such governments and their territories, and can rapidly include political-military confrontations of big powers.

(d) The costs of supporting small wars, and the preparations for them, are burdensome for both the United States and the USSR—depleting manpower and other resources that are badly needed at home, and for productive growth in the developing countries. Small wars make it extremely difficult to plan productive investment in, and international trade with, such countries.

(e) Sustained fighting of small wars has involved violation of international laws of war, thereby breaking down the traditions of legal and moral constraint that were devised to limit even conflict by force of arms. Chinese boundaries are more reliably stabilized in a world where aggression against state borders is discouraged by international force. Weakening these restraints weakens the security of all men.

For the small countries, too, war has become a sure loser. Even poor states support armed forces as the main available way to insure their own security, but the quest for security through military advantage has a high price. Armed forces of developing countries are supported by their own budgets, exceeding $18 billion per year. These forces restrain productive economic growth and encourage adventurist governments in which military officers play a dominant role.

The quest for military superiority presses small states toward dependence on the great powers for military supplies, and for military alliances. However, reliance on the great powers has a counter-productive effect on the security and vulnerability of smaller states.

Small countries are rendered increasingly insecure by the proliferation and growing power of national armies —even though these are equipped with "conventional" weapons, for these weapons have been made highly mobile and quite destructive. In the Kashmir fighting during 1965, India and Pakistan each destroyed major parts of its armed forces within about two weeks. (One estimate rated the value of what was destroyed as equal to the cost of an Aswan Dam project.)

But the common interest of small states in a competent international security system is frustrated by the contradictory development of military technologies and of international political and peace-keeping institutions. Military technologies invent ways to shorten the time of movement and of firepower effect. International political and peace-keeping institutions involve political debate, votes, veto systems and long convening time. Two days may be a rather short period for a Security Council debate. But two days of military operations with modern weapons can produce great damage in small countries.

The present writer has conferred with senior foreign ministry officials of several smaller states during the past years. Their view of the world includes reservations about

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he workability of the present United Nations peace-keeping machinery, especially with respect to *speed, impartiality* and *reliability*. From such uncertainties, the governments of small states have concluded that they must place prime reliance on their own armed forces to preserve their national security.

The United States and Russia share an interest in trying afresh to come to grips with the main world security problem of our time: "small wars," and the absence of any reliable mechanism for dealing with small wars. *A U.S.-USSR joint effort in this direction is fundamental.*

The following is given to illustrate, by concrete example, some of the innovations that may be appropriate in designing an international peace-keeping force. This force, operated under the United Nations, may require characteristics that are known elsewhere, but are somewhat novel in the international sphere. The first of these is automatic triggering for speed of operation.

A big-city police force is an automatically triggered security system. When a citizen telephones, the police—following standard operating procedures—are ordered to the site without intervention of political officers or legislative bodies. At the site of alleged law breaking the police are bound by a strict code of behavior: they must establish the fact of law violation; if established the police must stop the law-breaking action. Thereafter, the police are bound by fixed orders and procedures to turn the matter over for jurisdiction to a separate judicial body.

In the international sphere a highly mobile force could be automatically triggered by a call from a government to one of, say, five centers around the world. Within hours an inspecting team could arrive at any site and establish (a) whether there is indeed an armed conflict, or an imminent conflict; and (b) whether the dispute is international. Criteria for "international" must be rigorously defined; for example, as (1) conflict between armed forces of two states; or (2) conflict for control of a government within a state in which a second state participates. Once a dispute is certified as international, the peace-keeping force itself arrives at the site, declares and administers a cease-fire. All this could be done in a matter of hours following an initial call for help. Thereafter, within a fixed time limit, the international force could be required to turn over the dispute at issue to an appropriate body. Two adjudicating bodies could probably cope with the array of conceivable disputes: an international court to settle issues of dominion between governments; a plebiscite conducting body to settle armed international disputes over who shall be a government.

Reliability of operation of the international security force could be insured by standard operating procedures which are binding on the general staff. In conventional armies standard operating procedures pertain primarily to the functioning of personnel below the general staff level. For the international security force, they must be written, with special detail, for the general staff itself.

Impartiality is designed into the international security system by two main elements: (a) the specifications of the standard operating procedures; (b) the rules governing the officer group that commands the force. The latter element is vital for insuring impartiality of peace-keeping forces. Devices like the following are required:

The general staff of the international force may be composed of, say, twenty men: ten career officers from states in the Security Council; ten nominated by a random selection from other states. These twenty are equal in rank and are assigned to functions in rotation. These and similar arrangements are intended to produce functioning according to formal rule, rather than according to political preferences of the senior staff.

In the short run, an international peace-keeping force could be composed of highly mobile mixed units of the U.S. and Soviet armies. Until the international peace-keeping machinery is fully formulated and established, this force could be deployed for peace-keeping operations at the joint decision of the President of the United States and the Chairman of Soviet Socialist Republics.

This temporary force could supervise an armistice and/or cooling-off operations in the Middle East and in Vietnam, for example, while diplomatic processes are operated. The termination of these wars and war crises, as part of the move to a wider agreement, will enhance the prestige and moral authority of the governments that undertake this action.

Class of '67: The Gentle Desperadoes

HAROLD KAPLAN
Bennington College

Ten years is apparently enough time to draw a 180-degree arc of change in the temperament of generations. Certainly the most tentative judge of the contrast between 1957 and 1967 (although one would like to place the first year of emphasis somewhat earlier than 1957) would agree that the college generation today has reversed the field on almost every point made by the participants in *The Nation* forum of 1957. This goes for the "careful young men" in every aspect of "carefulness," the desire for security, the stress on personal rather than social problems, the appetite for intellectual criticism, the somewhat complacent cynicism which began perhaps as the "spirit of irony and detachment" in some college classroom. One coinage of the time was the "silent generation." We can agree at least that the silence has ended.

The observer today, nevertheless, is puzzled by contradictions. He sees political activism mingle (often in the same people) with drugged or undrugged withdrawal. He sees a religious search combined with a ferocious intention to assail every orthodoxy. The apocalyptic nihilism of Genet mingles with passionate attestations for the napalmed child in Vietnam. A demonstration against war is joined largely by those whose "reverence for life"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has more in common with William Burroughs and Henry Miller than with Albert Schweitzer. This may suggest that such extremes in moral manifestations have a common source in outrage and despair. Nevertheless, the observer is affected by the unappetizing mixture of extreme moral arrogance and exhibitionistic social irresponsibility. One must ask why. Why the search for purity and the claim to find it; and why the will to surrender everything; the poorly disguised death wish?

In the spring of 1957, The Nation *devoted a special issue to the Class of '57 which was published under the title of "The Careful Young Men" (March 9, 1957). Now, ten years later, here are some impressions of the Class of '67 solicited, in most instances, from contributors to the earlier symposium. We regret that we have been unable, for lack of space, to include all the statements we received; in some instances, we have condensed the responses.*

The generation which teaches today's youth, my generation, based its dominant intellectual tone on the vague pathos of the life of difficulty (the depression, World War II, the bomb, the cold war). At the barest level, our gospel was that of survival, a modest ironic humanism, or at a more grandiose level, a tragic humanism which underscored mutual compassion as the reward of endurance. Our text could have been taken from the words of the best writer of *our* youth.

> I decline to accept the end of man. It is easy enough to say that man is immortal simply because he will endure; that when the last ding-dong of doom has clanged and faded from the last worthless rock hanging tideless in the last red and dying evening, that even then there will still be one more sound: that of his puny inexhaustible voice, still talking. I refuse to accept this. I believe that man will not merely endure: he will prevail. He is immortal not because he alone among creatures has an inexhaustible voice but because he has a soul, a spirit capable of compassion and sacrifice and endurance. *William Faulkner, Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech, 1950.*

But if that is the mood of our teaching, then I think we talk at cross purposes with many of our students today. They are turning their backs on pain and on repression, particularly as these seem ordained by necessity. They think experience is a god, they are the new romantics. They want the apocalypse in their daily lives, in each moment, perhaps because they have given up on the long-range terms for salvation, and perhaps because they are the first generation to be really aware that the world's last day is a possibility. Life is very short for them; like Ivan Karamazov and for the same reasons, they would rather not live past 30. They are contemptuous and indifferent to both past and future. Above all their trust is in their emotions and sensations. Intelligence is a betrayer, if it is not a fraud. It entangles both truth and experience in the conflict of ideologies, the relativism of science, the pragmatism of bureaucracies, the "absurdity" of the universe, and the casual universality of death.

In moral and political terms, this generation, facing death on the one hand and superfluous wealth on t other, wants simple purity above anything else. Everyo lies to them, and there is something endlessly wrong the way action or experience invariably produces a l And so they search for truthful action, which may find climax in the arms of state troopers as they haul out t manifestants from the lobbies of state capitols. A pe fectly passive and perfectly sincere demonstration—bur ing a draft card or smoking pot—attests itself; the co sequences will take care of themselves.

Surely this is a case of the young teaching a lesson, the only way perhaps audible in the modern worlc great noise; that is, by hysterical display, half in the sty of slick public relations and half in the style of since inspiration. What is important for a well-intended o server who cannot share in the specific displays or gi them direct sympathy, is to understand their meanin Above all there is immediacy of meaning in the characte istic habits and attitudes of these young. They are pu suing most eagerly the art of exhibiting themselves ar making a manifestation. They are in part determined reproach us, even in ways related to the Japanese for of suicide which is conducted in the presence of one enemy. One can also sense the license of those who re on the bad conscience of others and therefore feel capab of moral blackmail.

Whatever the incidental attributes, pleasant or unplea ant, if asked to make a general judgment, one must judg that they are a religious generation and a moralizing on perhaps finally to a degree of ferocity matched only b the old Puritans. It would surprise Marx (who has bee much surprised by history) that the strongest revolu tionary impulses today come from the educated middl class young, scions of privilege and permissive upbringin These have been brought to feel most keenly the mor taint of modern life, and they are evangelical in spiri wanting much more than bread or even equality. The want a moral communion among themselves and the re lease of ultimate emotions, that is, religious emotion within themselves. They say that drugs, sex and crow emotions give them this, and they more than half mea it, or more than half want it. For some of us this ma be the bridge of sympathy with them. What puzzles u is the silly cheapness of the price they hope to pay fc such experiences.

KARL SHAPIRO
University of Nebraska

To a college professor, a generation is not thirty year but four. Every four years an army of freshmen gradu ate. When they graduate they are a power generation moving into all the managerial slots. Their political line have by now been set, from absolute left to absolut right. Only the narrow-minded, technically directed stu

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ent—the medical student, engineer or educationalist—isses the intellectual crises. The others engage in the ime of Overthrow the Values.

I taught at Berkeley and Davis for a year and a half st before the initial California earthquake which took ace across the Bay in San Francisco, unbeknown to e University of California. The English Department Berkeley was the largest and most catatonic I had er taught in, still living in the afterglow of the Gold ush. That was in 1956! The "multiversity" after a ecade of shock treatment still doesn't know what hit it.

The Careful Generations had no choices but callow nicism and withdrawal. In one aspect they became a iminal bourgeoisie with a winner-take-all attitude. Stuents read philosophy or psychology to gather evience about amorality, the only ethic available to them. he California student breakthrough, like all West Coast rthquakes, was part of a series. About the time of the eat annunciation, the revolts of the twenties came home roost. For instance, all the taboos about publication impolite literary and political and psychological works egan to be abolished in the highest courts. People of my eneration saw to that. Or people of my persuasion of y generation. We did it well aware of the dangers to e values we stood for. It was an imperative to defend e Bad, which is ironically an American principle.

Shortly after I arrived in Lincoln, Neb., to teach at e state university, I was mildly attacked by the students r advocating American intervention in Hungary. "Go ack to Hungary!" said signs on my door.

This was the period of seeking an underground for ung university students everywhere. The structure of withdrawal society had already been blueprinted by e beat movement. It provided—but books have been ritten about that—a total way of life, from clothing to oetics to God. Its greatest advantage was that it supied a point of view about everything *without any goal rationale*. It fed every yearning, and created unimagiable hungers for which there was no food. Politically, the eats were very gauche, now backing Castro, now atcking communism. But the liberal professor always felt his duty to keep them going; in some vestigial way they epresented freedom and truth and the values.

When the gloss wore off the beat movement the stuent generations entered the waxworks as the acid generaon. Using the number four as a divisor of generations, have taught five generations of college students. I have, think, watched them carefully as "generations." I have een what I think to be the ultimate generation, the genration of ultimate withdrawal. One sits around thinking f new names for them: The Autistic Generation, the unaway Generation—what difference does it make? here is only one interesting thing about this generation: nlike all biological generational revolutions, this one oes not want or intend to rejoin the human race, or so argues. It rejects every stance which implies a discipline. n politics it cultivates amnesia, in poetics, aphasia. It dores violence and hysteria. It is the perfect cultural roth for fascism. The beat people had a marginal polick and a sense of community; their drug was weed. he new generation has no need of politick or commuity or poetry. They have acid.

The dissidents and intellectuals and would-be artists of the current generation are ripe for the totalitarian state of mind. Like the intellectuals in Germany in the 1930s, they turn their backs on the horrors of the "bourgeois" society which supports them. They ignore their own fate and the fate of all. They easily surrender any principle and trade in any idealism, however specious, of a Martin Luther King for a Mafia variety of Black Power. They defend Cassius Clay in the same way and for the same reasons that Hitler defended Max Schmeling. Their wall-sized posters are all icons of the movie gangster. Their love of money and expensive artifacts links them to the higher echelons of the power structure.

The Right is after power at any cost, but they are on the aggressive. The New Left is passive power which is leaking away in the pad. The Right wants to take over. The Left seems to be waiting for some Boxer Rebellion or wet nurse to get it out of bed. The Left is Easternized; it exhibits all the withdrawal symptons of the Orient. In LSD exercises about bigger and better orgasms it even uses a stage director who reads Kahlil Gibran to the two about-to-be lovers. (Gibran, as every professor knows, is perhaps a step above Joyce Kilmer.)

I use the acid generation as a metaphor. The drug is not yet that available in the student union. I am talking about the intellectual withdrawal of a generation which uses acid or something like it as a total mystique.

Since World War II college students and their juniors have lived in a climate of absolute contempt, a climate created and fostered by their parents and their institutions. Crude and hypocritical government actions abroad and at home have reinforced the belief of the new generations that everything is SHIT. The most common noun, adjective, verb and mark of punctuation in their language is SHIT. No poem dares to leave the word out. No painting. No smile. The motto of the new generation of the Left might be: Blood, Nirvana, Shit.



R. J. KAUFMANN
University of Rochester

Why is it that, at age 42, I feel both closer and further, more definitively, apart from my students than I did ten years ago? I have tried the anthropologists' pair: shame culture vs. guilt culture, and it works passably. I can say my generation was brought up in the late afternoon of the bourgeois guilt culture of the 19th- and pre-Hiroshimic 20th century. We felt or were made to feel responsible, or at least calibrated responsibility, in terms of each person's quotient of active concern. We saw too little difference between ourselves and what are now called the "disadvantaged" to feel ashamed of our possessions; rather we felt guilty that we had been duped into complicity in prolonging an unjustified state of affairs. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world still seemed tractable to our wills if we were brave enough, if our guilt performed as the sharp spur we required it to be.

That is changed now. Few of our younger counterparts see the world as tractable, few believe in the actuality, let alone the efficacy, of the will. They do feel ashamed; and shame is a confusing emotion. It makes you apologetic for your virtues, suicidal toward your strengths.

I am interested in the inaccessible features of this current college generation whose attractions are so great, whose moral candor is so appealing. Even if they don't know what they think, or even suspect what they think, they are willing to embark on nearly any type of "trip" or expedition of "retrieval." They are disconcertingly honest; their coolness, their self-withholding is a burden to them and is only the husk of their evident natures. They love to confess, though there is much shame in the fact that they know their confessions are, however procedurally gratifying, in substance disappointing. Oh, really to be misunderstood, to have some of those densely compacted recesses which were the neurosis-producing specialty of the old guilt culture!

Noting their willingness, their institutionalized frustrations, their inner anger which stands in almost exact equilibrium with their gentleness, I ask myself what makes my students strange. It is their perception of rebellion as a form of hoarding. What are they hoarding? Fugitive memorabilia of individualism. And they are stealing, through reductive parody and popistic replay, the design specifications of official *status*. Jokes can perform psychic murders if they are good enough. LBJ, for example, has been subverted through popular art. For all the grim consequences of his judgments, *he* is no longer a serious matter. This is what is different about these students. They are ironic *before* experience; our generation could only be so *after* it. They are slowly inventing a new ethic of accommodation under the illusion of incubating revolutionary possibilities. It is a confused time, but, radically, the word "confuse" can mean a way of melting oppositions and thereby fusing a new wholeness below the familiar levels of our intellectual distinctions.

ALLAN SEAGER
University of Michigan

There is a brass plaque on the steps of the Michigan Union where, at two o'clock in the morning, President Kennedy first outlined the work of the Peace Corps before a huge crowd. Kennedy was the last hero to students and many have joined the Peace Corps. It is, I think, symptomatic of a great store of idealism that wants to express itself in a task they can feel as fundamentally good, one they can throw themselves into without reserve, with a whole heart. In the same spirit, many of the kind who worked in Mississippi among the Negroes or went on the Selma march are now going into Vista or social work in the cities. I have not heard a student say he was going out to make a million dollars in the last twenty-five years and the student who does take a job with a big corporation does it with his eyes open, cynically.

There is a link as well as a division between this kind of idealism and the student protests. (Michigan is where the student sit-in started.) The situation is not as turbulent as it is at Berkeley, probably because many of the complaints now alive there were settled at Michigan some time ago, but there are still protests and they are so various it is hard to believe that the obvious reasons for them are the real ones. There have been protests of all kinds about Vietnam; about draft procedures; the grading system; film censorship; about nearly every aspect of students' relations with the university from the quality of food in the dorms to the right of the administration to bar students from making academic policy.

The arresting feature of all these protests is that they are not political. There are active Young Democrat and Young Republican clubs on the campus but they do not sponsor protests; no organized Communist activity is perceptible, as it was in the thirties. If asked, almost any given protester would say he was a liberal but he would be hard put to define what this means except in terms of what he is against.

What seems to inform all these angry gestures, the real cause of them, is a resentment against the quality of life in the United States. These young people have discovered that their dossiers are more important than their persons; they have learned that admissions tests either to a university or a job, are merely elaborate forms of self-betrayal. They think most jobs are a rat race. They are cynical about most candidates running for office. They do not believe that any American who opens his mouth abroad today will be believed, since what he says has been compromised by the CIA. They see whatever form of the Establishment they know as a constricting force. They find money easy to come by, but in the midst of opulence they would like to find out the deficiencies of life. And they believe less and less that they can find them in the classroom.

One group, then, has made a satisfactory commitment (and it is significant that the Peace Corps does its work outside the United States). The other group, the protesters, are critically sophisticated. It is hard to put anything over on them, but their very sophistication prevents them from seeing a commitment they could make. They have not thought of a revolution because they are already corrupted by what they would revolt against, the technological society in which we live. It is the bag that contains all their protests but it would be like fish revolting against the sea.



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

J. A. BRYANT, Jr.
University of North Carolina

Some critics have written misleadingly of a "Kennedy generation"; but the real significance of the Kennedys' successes, for the young at least, has been that a generation of students, mindful that their predecessors since the end of the war had had to spend their college careers as citizens on probation, began to think seriously of immediate involvement in adult affairs. It was the civil rights movement that cracked the door for them; for in those early sit-ins, demonstrations and marches many children of affluent white parents took up the cause of frustrated Negro youth and began the long-overdue exposure of decay in middle-class mores. After John Kennedy's election to the Presidency the door swung open, and college students ever since have been marching off vigorously in all directions on a variety of causes, some genuine and some spurious, breaching frontiers and shattering taboos wherever such things seemed to stand in their way. In all their new territories, from the exploitation of sex to the controversy over Vietnam, the passion that drives them is that same deeply felt need to be taken seriously and accorded the right to chart their own course in ethics and morals, in education and politics.

The young writers speak with great seriousness about all the experiences that were forbidden to their older brothers and sisters. They imitate deliberately those orders of society and those races which they believe have not been contaminated by the conservatism of middle-class America—the Negro, the folk singer, the truck driver, the migrant worker, the current inhabitants of skid row, even the Southern poor white. They rebel on principle. So pervasive has their assortment of gestures become in the middle sixties that it has submerged the pallid and modish anticipations that went by the collective name of "beat" in the late fifties. Now that term, which once seemed certain to survive, is seldom heard except from those who are looking for a word to condemn any deviation from older standards.

Another decade at least will be necessary before we can see whether all this is a prelude to a genuine direction or whether, like the beat movement that it replaced, it has been simply a succession of nervous poses on a nation-wide scale. That the current movement continues to take place mainly on college campuses is cause for suspicion. Instead of seeking to compete in a market place, these young writers are taking refuge in the proliferating writing programs, subsisting on scholarships that have grown just large enough to be lived on, and finding an easy outlet for their poems and stories in the little magazines now being published on university budgets. Some do manage to get out a book (frequently an M.A., or M.F.A., thesis) and then proceed to capitalize on it by touring other campuses to give readings of their work and the work of their friends. It is possible for one with a modicum of talent to go on in this way indefinitely, never quite "making it" but never suffering discomfort either, and enjoying all the while membership in something that is beginning to resemble a national fraternity. The question unanswered at the moment is, just how much of this talent being generated on college campuses can survive the academic climate or, having done that, escape it to live unprotected in that outside world where ultimately any strong art must seek its proper nourishment and means of survival?



JOHN R. WILLINGHAM
University of Kansas

Unlike the "careful young men" of 1957, today's undergraduates will to be seriously involved. And if their efforts are centered on one purpose, it is to attack the "Establishment" wherever its vulnerability shows. Their stance has been aptly called "romantic anarchy": "romantic," indeed they are, but the "anarchy" is tempered by a militant idealism. If a temporary conformity will help to get a Wilson Fellowship or a Rhodes Scholarship, they will cheerfully conform. But as soon as the awards have been announced, back they will go to working over the "Establishment."

Paul Goodman provides a kind of activist testament for youth. His *Growing Up Absurd* (and no doubt his recently published *Five Years*) furnishes ammunition for unceasing attacks and siege of the "Establishment." The Christian existentialists like Bishops Pike and Robinson, Teilhard de Chardin, Leslie Paul and Paul Van Buren are familiar names to the campus intellectual even though he may not have read their books. Debunking orthodox theology, such writers stimulate campus readers who may never go near one of the denominational centers.

The best students are indifferent to the literary canons of the old "new critics." They expect to be "turned on" through reading. If the alternative is a life of attainable rationality or one of increasing absurdity, they expect fiction or poetry to exhibit less structural precision and more existentialist impact. Consequently, highly literate students prefer the Pound of the *Cantos* and regard Eliot with suspicion. It has been twelve years since Allen Ginsberg recited "Howl" in San Francisco, but the reverberations on university campuses still resound. When Ginsberg, Robert Creeley, Gary Snyder, Robert Bly or Denise Levertov have visited this campus, the appeal of "activist" poetry is all too obvious.

In fiction, I sense that the appeal of William Golding and J. D. Salinger is waning somewhat, although it may be more accurate to say merely that *Lord of the Flies* and *The Catcher in the Rye* seem no longer to have their former primacy. Hemingway, Faulkner and Fitzgerald are still important to undergraduates, although I think they are beginning to seem dated and perhaps a little quaint. Joyce provokes real excitement outside the classroom, much more because of *Finnegans Wake* than for *Ulysses*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I am told that almost every male undergraduate who reads at all has digested with gusto Joseph Heller's *Catch-22* and applauded its stern judgment of our civilization. For the same reason, Saul Bellow's "existential approach" to the exposure of "phonies," academe and the "Establishment" commands their allegiance. J.R.R. Tolkien's *Lord of the Rings,* using fantasy as a way to delineate a world of sanity and meaning, elicits a cult. James Baldwin's influence fluctuates with the ebb and flow of civil rights activity. Other writers who seem to speak to the juniors and seniors of 1967 are John Updike, John Knowles, Anthony Burgess, Kingsley Amis, Joyce Cary and Bernard Malamud. Any way you view the campus of today, it's infinitely more promising than the cool acceptance of 1957!

LAWRENCE LIPKING
Princeton University

Students have become very sensitive to the kind of interest that older generations take in them. We have too often exploited their feelings of rebellion because we need something to preach, something to fear. They will not always satisfy this need. After the recent arrests of some Princetonians on charges of possession of marijuana, C.B.S. television interviewed a few undergraduates and encouraged them to be as hip as possible. The undergraduates, however, persisted in being themselves, good-natured and sensible. Finally one of them (a Negro) delivered the last blow: "Look, I'm only a freshman, and I don't know everything that goes on around here. But I can tell you this: Princeton isn't exactly a hotbed of revolt!"

Nevertheless, students are different now from the students of ten years ago, and they read and write differently. They are much less careful young men, more impatient, more independent, even in their poetry. Last month I asked a seminar, some poets, some not, to write sonnets. Some of the replies were neatly crafted verses in iambic pentameter, perfectly rhymed, on conventional themes, with a white space between octave and sestet. These were the sonnets of the students who did not write poetry. The others, the poets, wrote a variety of free and personal lyrics. They assumed the right to make a sonnet whatever they chose.

Similarly, the books with which undergraduates sympathize tend to be scornful of any authority but insistent about the need for seriousness, sincerity, moral values. Works that defend the Establishment are thought trivial, and so are works that celebrate destruction. Michael Harrington's *The Accidental Century,* which balances its images of disorder with at least one faint hope, excites many Princetonians, including those who expect one day to be in the nation's service. Among novelists, William Golding is popular. Young readers (especially freshmen) are fascinated by his pictures of corrupted innocence; they identify with the innocence, enjoy the corruption, and take pleasure in wondering whether this makes them cynical. "Cynical" and "decadent," words rarely met in current literary criticism, still form a major part of undergraduates' critical vocabularies. Yet the books that matter most start from the premise of modern confusions and breakdowns but contrive to offer a solution. Even though most Princeton students do not quite believe in the reality of Bill Bradley, the all-American straight-arrow, they find his accomplishments far more disturbing than the message of any black humorist. In spite of everything, in a world of unheroism, can there still be giants walking the earth?

Ten years ago, Carlos Baker thought that undergraduates were living through an Age of Consolidation. Today, it seems that not much has been consolidated, and that acting in the present makes more sense than preparing for a future that may never come. An age of active resistance, an age of skeptical engagement, has succeeded the time when the academy could offer shelter from any immediate problem. Students, like their teachers, are learning to live without a court of ultimate appeal, but to make their conditional appeals as loud as possible.



WALLACE STEGNER
Stanford University

The hippie poet Gary Snyder, declaring that the revolution now being made by young people will leave not one value of the old America standing, is not fooling. Neither was Mario Savio, threatening to bring the University of California to a grinding halt if student demands were not met; neither was Dave Harris, who as president of the Stanford student body challenged trustees and administration and threatened alumni blood vessels, insisting on student participation in the educational process. Neither are the students and poets who chant four-letter words in crowds, either to prove that nothing is dirty or to "liberate the love-words." Walker Percy's last gentleman, who read a novel and found it "all about orgasms —forty-one," was making the acquaintance of a writer with a crusade.

I do not pretend to understand the far-out young, but one thing they clearly share, whether they are passivists on a Zen-love-pot-LSD course or activists strident for civil rights and social and educational reform, is the crusading spirit. Even the hippie who has tuned in, turned on and dropped out flings his hair, beard, clothes, habits, drug-and-sex kicks, as a dare in the face of conventional

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

society. He wears the uniform of alienation and intransigence, though he utilizes the weapons of quietism and nonviolence.

Activist or passivist, they are moved by disgust for much that society offers, and repudiate many of its demands. Being young (except for some of their gurus, who are only cosmetically young) and having grown up in the age of antibiotics, the Pill and the Pleasure Principle, they share ample and uninhibited hormones. As a group they are reckless, they stampede toward the emancipated future like dry cattle scenting a water hole; and they are all the less regardful of consequences because their faith leads them to disparage tradition, convention, organization, discipline, the past and all forms of authority. To a puzzled elder, they often seem to throb rather than think. The eagerness with which they explore and sample the possibilities of hallucinatory drugs, hypnotic dancing, strobe lights, yoga, diet and every variety of mysticism (the past is O.K. if it's Oriental) emphasizes how bent this generation is upon losing its head.

In all this, or nearly all, these students are profoundly different from those one knew on the same campus only a decade ago. Ten years ago a visiting guru would never have got 150 Stanford students enthusiastically dancing his "trance dance" through most of a night. Ten years ago recruiting corporations would have had a respectful audience of budding company men; now they can hardly get appointments, because the potential company men are off listening to a young man expound his religion of touch as the means of universal love.

Ten years ago any appraisal of student attitudes had to take account of an alarming caution, a carefulness, an unwillingness to stick out the neck. But that was three generations back. Those students had grown up during a war that threatened everything they hoped for, and they hooked like limpets onto the nearest security. The present generation has known no war that it has to respect or subscribe to, and it has known no depression. It has grown up (and I am speaking, naturally, of the upper-middle-class children who characteristically make up both activist and passivist branches of the youth revolution) in almost uninterrupted prosperity. Adventure, not security, is what tempts them; and as the world shrinks and swarms, adventure of a physical kind is harder to come by. This generation goes to sex and drugs as the generation of the 1840s went to the Gold Rush.

Moreover, in a permissive school and home atmosphere, these children were taught togetherness as an ideal. The Haight-Ashbury young, making love not war, are only doing what we taught them. And in questioning everything, including its elders, this generation is likewise proving the efficacy of its nurture, for it was taught to take nothing on faith, to question, to doubt.

On any campus, even on the West Coast, the aggressive passivists and the devoted activists make up probably no more than 20 per cent of the student population. But they are a highly visible, highly vocal, generally intelligent and incessantly fascinating 20 per cent, and they exert influence both horizontally upon their contemporaries and vertically upon their elders. The rate of change being what it is, they may be gone by 1970, replaced by something quite other. When everything is permitted, everything will be tried. As an elder, one may take a gloomy view of the consequences of so much permissiveness, so little coercion from social traditions and norms; and one hears, again and again, a rather wistful dissatisfaction among the young themselves, though not often from those farthest out. Many would like to be told, more than they are, what is socially *right*, even if they have to find out later that it is wrong. Many crave a direction and an authority that we have taught them to distrust.

All of which is only to say that we have taught them to search and experiment, and they are searching and experimenting. And few generations—forget the mistakes they are bound to make, and are making—have been more alert and alive. Idealism is highly visible among the college students I know in 1967, and that goes for some of the alarming ones as well as for those, less rebellious or more hopeful of the old order, who put their devotion into the Peace Corps or Head Start or something traditionally liberal and humanitarian.

MAO'S REVOLUTION

Keeping China Safe for Communism

JAMES R. TOWNSEND

Mr. Townsend, author of Political Participation in Communist China, *is assistant professor of political science at the University of California.*

Hong Kong

The proponents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution claim to be the vanguard of the most momentous revolution in the history of the world, engaged in a titanic struggle to push China into communism without any concessions to the temptations of tradition, capitalism or revisionism. They are indeed participants in a revolution of immense importance; perhaps their use of the superlative is correct, although we may leave judgment on that point to history. But are they really the vanguard of the revolution or have they taken up the rear guard with an outmoded revolutionary tradition of their own? Mao Tse-tung and his supporters are certainly setting the pace, and in this sense stand at the forefront of the current struggle. From other perspectives, however, their leadership evokes images that seem more in keeping with the past than with the future. Student demonstrators surging through the streets, outbreaks of violence among opposing groups, verbal and physical assaults on the remnants of traditional

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

culture, the hint of xenophobia in intimidation of foreign residents—all these phenomena of the Cultural Revolution have parallels in the turbulent years between 1900 and 1927. More significantly, perhaps, the disorders are justified as a means of perpetuating a revolutionary style that has its principal origins in the 1930s and 1940s. To be sure, China today is distinctly different from China of pre-Communist years; whatever its slogans and by-products, the Cultural Revolution is not simply a replay of earlier upheavals. There is good reason, however, to question the "revolutionary" credentials of the current campaign.

The Cultural Revolution began in November, 1965, following a September meeting of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders at which Mao apparently insisted on a new campaign against "bourgeois" and "revisionist" influences within China. Two broad considerations lay behind this decision. The first derived from domestic policy problems of the preceding ten years, with Mao's determination to preserve his revolutionary style providing the theme. In 1956-57, the CCP had engaged in a great debate over the best approach to future Socialist construction. There were then strong pressures for relaxation of political restrictions, for a more regular and institutionalized way of life and for increased reliance on the more highly trained and specialized strata growing up in Chinese society.

The "basic completion" of Socialist transformation in 1949-56 gave strength to the demands for a new approach. However, many leaders of the party were deeply suspicious of such a move. Their experience had been largely in the practice of revolution, in which under Mao's leadership they had developed a belief in the invincible power of mass movements, provided that the masses had proper political leadership and were ideologically committed to the cause. They distrusted bureaucracy and bureaucrats, and feared that expectations of material gain might diminish revolutionary fervor and sacrifice. Above all, they feared any reduction of their own political power, especially if it were to slip into the hands of intellectuals and specialists who were largely Western trained and oriented. Not surprisingly, after an abortive experiment with "liberalization" in 1957, the CCP decided to push ahead on the familiar model of mass mobilization. It was a fateful decision, for it based Mao's prestige and hopes (they were to become inextricably intertwined) on sustaining a revolutionary atmosphere which was certain to cause tension and frustration as China strove to modernize.

The strain soon became evident. In 1959, there was heavy criticism within the top party leadership of the people's communes and Great Leap Forward policy—a policy which epitomized the Maoist approach. More criticism cropped up in 1961-62, following the disastrous consequences of the Great Leap; the party tacitly accepted some of the criticism and introduced significant modifications in the economic and political line of the Great Leap period. To Mao, however; this could be only a temporary retreat. In September, 1962, the Central Committee reaffirmed his call for an uncompromising march toward communism, relying on the old slogans of sacrifice, indoctrination, mobilization and, always, "politics in command." Over the next three years, the CCP launched a series of campaigns designed, at least on the surface, to establish universal acceptance of the thought of Mao Tse-tung as the guarantor of the revolution's future. But the fanfare of mass movements could not conceal the continued existence of certain concessions to the peasants' desire for individual enterprise, of widespread yearnings for material comfort and a more settled life, and of pressures for a less politicized training and use of intellectual resources. Mao's sense of frustration must have mounted steadily as he saw his ideas canonized but somehow never carried to realization by a complex bureaucratic structure he could no longer personally direct. Characteristically, and probably with a sense of desperation, he chose to try once more to force China into conformity with his ideals.

The second broad consideration that led to a new campaign in the fall of 1965 was the fear of an approaching crisis in the international field. The growth of American military power in Vietnam brought enormous pressure to bear on China. To continue the hard line against American involvement in Vietnam raised risks of a military clash with the United States. Could China afford this risk and how should it be met? Mao's answer was that the risk must be accepted, though not magnified by precipitate action, and that it must be met by preparing China for a people's war of resistance against foreign invasion. This answer must have appeared unrealistic to some of his colleagues. Possibly some proposed a more aggressive policy of active defense against the American threat. But certainly the main alternative was to consider the (to Mao) unthinkable thought of a *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union that would insure some degree of Russian military support and possibly open the way to a renewal of economic and technical assistance as well. The Soviet Union was plainly open to negotiations along this line. How far the idea may have been pursued is, of course, obscure, but it is safe to assume that its logic alone was sufficiently powerful to spur Mao into action against any compromise with revisionism. Therefore, although the roots of the Cultural Revolution lie deep in domestic problems of economic and political development, its timing and urgency are related to foreign policy questions.

The Cultural Revolution's progress through April 1967, may be divided into five general stages. In the first, from November, 1965, through May, 1966, the campaign developed slowly around a series of articles attacking a small group of writers who had been particularly critical in 1961-62, of Mao's leadership. The "black gang," as the writers were labeled, were prominent but second-ranking figures in the cultural and propaganda field. The attacks were suddenly intensified in May, 1966, culminating in a reorganization of the Peking Party Committee and the purge of P'eng Chen, then simultaneously serving as Mayor of Peking and head of that city's Party Committee. This implied that "black" influences were not only prevalent throughout the higher levels of cultural and propaganda organs (largely concentrated in Peking) but that the Peking Party organization had tried to protect

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Waite: The Sun; London (Ben Roth).

"Oh, No. Not Another *Cabinet Reshuffle."*

hem. At the same time, it became apparent that Lu Ting-i, director of the Propaganda Department of the Party Central Committee, and some of his subordinates were in rouble. The earlier disappearance of Army Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing seemed now to have been an ominous forerunner of a more sweeping struggle. The Cultural Revolution was clearly not going to stop with the disgrace of a few writers.

The second stage occupied June and July. Important editorials in early June revealed the removals and reorganizations mentioned above and informed the people hat everyone was now to participate in a thorough cleansing of the infected organizations, which were still identified largely in the cultural and propaganda network. The Central Committee dispatched work teams to schools and ower-level party organizations to ferret out those suspected of revisionist tendencies. Now the educational system became the most conspicuous arena of struggle as students were mobilized to attack school and party authorities. In mid-June, a joint party-state directive announced that university admissions and entrance examinations were suspended while a major educational reform was planned. As the campaign continued, however, it became increasingly confused and disorderly. Conflict, including some physical violence, broke out within the ranks of the attackers and demonstrators. Although some lower-level officials were singled out for criticism and abuse, he movement appeared to be losing its direction and control.

This uncertainty was resolved in the third stage, which began with the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee in Peking from August 1 to 12. The plenum revealed hat a split within the Central Committee had been responsible for the drift of preceding weeks. The "main target" became "those within the party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road." Popular attacks on such officials were specifically encouraged without being "afraid of disturbances" and without fear of suppression. A few days later, at a massive rally in Peking on August 18, the Red Guards made their formal public appearance. The Red Guards, who were at this stage largely recruited from middle school and young university students of "proletarian" family origin, had been mentioned in earlier reports, but they now became the main vehicle for attacking all manifestations of bourgeois or traditional "culture." More important, they also began to point the finger of capitalist guilt at those top-ranking "authorities" who had allegedly obstructed the Cultural Revolution during the second stage.

Red Guard accusations plus various appearances and references by party leaders gradually filled in the general outlines of the struggle. With Minister of Defense Lin Piao as his second in command and main spokesman, Mao was trying to strip of their power all those who were withholding full support for his policies. Although he had forced from the Central Committee a vague mandate to do this, he could not rely on the party apparatus as a whole. Consequently, he adopted a two-pronged strategy to accomplish his goal. On the one hand, he neutralized the structures through which his opponents might fight back. Specifically, this meant by-passing those organizations (the CCP itself and the major mass organizations for youth, women and workers) which were presumably under the influence of high party bureaucrats, and consolidating his control over the propaganda system; propaganda departments and major publications were "reorganized" (some for the second time), while some publications were simply suspended. On the other hand, he incited the Red Guards to drive his opponents out of office by accusation and intimidation; all classes were suspended to give free rein to the Red Guards, who were permitted to eat and travel throughout the country without charge. The strategy brought monumental disorder, but failed for a fundamental reason: Mao's ultimate targets were head of state Liu Shao-ch'i (long considered his likely successor) and Party General Secretary Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who had for several years been perhaps the two most powerful men in the state and party structure, although not equal to Mao in personal prestige. Their strength, resting

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on established influence and control over millions of state and party cadres, made them relatively immune to verbal attack and made forceful liquidation exceedingly dangerous. Three months passed with little visible initiative from either side. Turmoil in the streets continued, but the opposition sat tight.

The Cultural Revolution moved into its fourth stage about the beginning of December. Mao and his close supporters—most prominently Lin Piao, Premier Chou En-lai, party propagandist Ch'en Po-ta and Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing—tacitly conceded that the earlier effort had failed and that the opposition, rather than being a "handful" of authorities, was in reality a majority of those in higher positions. As denunciations, arrests, confessions and even suicides were reported (although few were reliably confirmed), tension mounted rapidly. Open clashes among students, workers and army units became more common. In January, Mao finally gave in to the logic of his campaign and ordered the army to intervene in support of the Cultural Revolution whenever necessary. Factories, cities and even provinces became units of contention between Maoist and opposition forces, with some reports of serious armed encounters. By February, it appeared that Mao was winning, that his supporters were gradually coming out on top in key municipal and provincial organizations. But the risk of full-scale civil war remained high, and it was perhaps for this reason that the domestic confrontation receded slightly in early February. Three weeks of demonstrations against the Soviet Embassy in Peking temporarily shifted the campaign's focus to international revisionism and brought a noticeable easing of the tense military situation.

The fifth stage, which has lasted from February down to the present, appears to have produced a temporary resolution, though not a definitive conclusion, to the Cultural Revolution. The Maoists are now trying to restore a semblance of order and normalcy to Chinese economic and political life: primary schools reopened in February, followed by middle schools in March; great stress has been placed on attending to economic work, particularly spring farming; exhortations to avoid "anarchism" and violations of discipline are frequent. At the same time, they have concentrated their fire on their two most powerful enemies—Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing—while offering vague promises that other leading cadres who have been criticized may yet rejoin the fold if they repent in time. By the end of April this tactic was working, at least to the extent of producing an uneasy compromise. Liu and Teng, along with the few most prominent leaders who had lost their positions earlier, were clearly to be sacrificed, but the "great majority" of cadres were being wooed to join the Maoist camp. Although outbursts of violence and mass criticism of some high officials still continue, the most dangerous and destructive phase of the Cultural Revolution seems to have run its course.

The preceding outline of events suggests that the Cultural Revolution, apart from stirring up massive turmoil and unrest, has been uncertain in its results. We can nonetheless point to certain consequences which are either permanent or, if temporary, likely to be reversed only with great difficulty. First, CCP leadership has undergone a drastic shake-up in which many of the old elite have either been removed from office or so heavily criticized that their effectiveness in a regime under Mao's control is open to doubt. New leaders, whose names are largely unknown to the outside world, will be emerging in the months and years ahead, while the possibility of a "counterrevolution" by those now disgraced cannot totally be discounted. China has thus entered a period in which there will be much more mobility and instability within the leadership than in the past.

Second, the historical subordination of the Chinese military structure to party organization has been broken. Lin Piao's replacement of Liu as heir apparent, the crucial support that the army gave Mao in January, and the general weakening of the party itself have all contributed to this development. The Chinese army has not been united in this crisis, and it remains a relatively "politicized" and nonprofessional force. But though the role it will play in the future would be hazardous to predict, it is a fact that it has become deeply involved in the governing of China.

Third, the Cultural Revolution has had a profound impact on the institutions of Communist China. The bypassing of the party and the mass organizations has seriously compromised the status of what were once the primary mechanisms of Communist control of the population. The state structure at local levels has suffered, too, as a result of its close identification with what Mao regards as his opposition. It is not yet clear what permanent institutions will replace those shattered, but the model for "temporary" local government now put forward is the "revolutionary committee"—an organization based on a "triple alliance" of representatives drawn from "revolutionary mass organizations," "revolutionary cadres" and local army units. Peking, Shanghai and several provinces have already formed such committees, and the struggle to establish them elsewhere is probably the most significant political activity going on in China today. Assuming that the Maoists continue to consolidate their control, one can sense the likely atmosphere of these committees. They will, in the first instance, be carefully chosen to insure support for Mao, and their policies and style of work will self-consciously reflect Mao's ideal of "revolutionary" leadership. In line with the compromise referred to above, they will try to coopt experienced cadres who may have committed "errors" but have now "reformed"; at the same time, they will be hypersensitive to subversion by "bourgeois" influences and will devote much of their attention to continuing the campaign against such influences. All this suggests that the work of the revolutionary committees will be full of tension, particularly when considering personnel and deciding who are the true "revolutionaries." Old feuds and associations will provide much of the substance of political debate; new "errors" and "enemies" will be uncovered.

The Cultural Revolution has also shed light on two long-range trends which seem to be particularly significant. One is the depth of opposition to the Maoist revolutionary style. The leaders of the campaign have claimed that the opposition was limited in numbers and that it was guilty of a deliberate attempt to overthrow

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mao's leadership. Neither claim has been convincing. The "opposition" apparently did not think of itself as an opposition at all. Rather than being a small, organized clique, conspiring to seize power, it was a loose but far-flung grouping of cadres who were in fact in power and largely responsible for the direction of Chinese society. Rather than being deliberate opponents of Mao, these ment were experienced and trusted leaders who accepted Mao's prestige and nominal leadership and were wholly committed to the continued development of socialism in China.

Their "errors" were, first, that they had accepted in the 1961 to 1965 period some modifications in the Maoist line which they believed to be necessary under the circumstances; second, that they had tried in June-July, 1966, to restrain the course of the Cultural Revolution to avoid permanent damage to the party and the economy; third, and here we may only speculate, that some of them had proposed alterations in Chinese foreign policy —possibly the only "error" in which they must have realized that they were openly challenging Mao's position. What is important to note here is that the immediate consequences of the Cultural Revolution may well intensify the convictions of those who believe that the deliberate perpetuation of a revolutionary atmosphere is both damaging and dangerous. Mao's enormous prestige, the backing of the army, and an offer of redemption for those who have been criticized are no doubt sufficient at present to still the voices of heresy. It is doubtful, however, that the heresy itself can be eradicated.

Padry, aux Ecoutes. Ben Roth Agency

The second point that deserves emphasis is the extent to which the Chinese people, especially the youth, have taken an active part in the Cultural Revolution. To be sure, many have retreated quietly to avoid involvement in a movement of such uncertain consequences. It is true, too, that in a general way the activities of the Red Guards have been guided by Maoist cadres, a significant number of whom are probably drawn from the army. The fact remains that the Cultural Revolution has elicited a level of popular agitation comparable to that of the first years of Communist rule. Much of this action cannot be explained simply by directives and organization from above, for it has not been that coherent or unanimous. What we have seen is groups of students, workers, soldiers and peasants engaging in debate, agitation and even physical combat to defend their interests or implement the Cultural Revolution's objectives as they understand them. In recent years, the CCP's "mass line" had seemed increasingly ritualized, a stale slogan that evoked the romance of earlier movements but was singularly lacking in substance. The Chinese people appeared to be slipping back into political passivity. But the Cultural Revolution has shown that nearly twenty years of indoctrination and example in the value of political activism has had its impact. A great many Chinese have perceived the political implications underlying the Cultural Revolution, have formed their judgments about them, and have been willing to act on these judgments even under the threat of retaliation.

How shall we relate these consequences and trends to the "vanguard or rear-guard" question posed at the outset? The promoters of the Cultural Revolution are the vanguard of a revolution only in the sense that they propose to overturn much of the existing power structure and infuse what replaces it with a good deal of new blood. This may be a significant political change, but it is scarcely a revolution given the substance of Mao's demands. The fact is that the stated ideals of the Cultural Revolution have been the mainstream of CCP propaganda for many years; there is no reason to believe that their realization will be any easier in the future than in the past. The institutional experimentation now under way offers no real promise of a significant redistribution of wealth or power among the strata of Chinese society. The campaign is best understood, therefore, as an attempt to perpetuate a political style which has been increasingly perceived as inappropriate to the times. It is a rear-guard action which may delay the natural death of the revolutionary atmosphere in Communist China but which will simultaneously, by its disruptive effects, increase resistance to that atmosphere. The surge of popular agitation that has accompanied the campaign suggests that future resistance may be more difficult than ever to contain.

Perhaps the most damning commentary on the campaign's "revolutionary" credentials is the difficulty it has to identify its supporters and opponents in realistic socio-economic terms and to promise any major groups that they will benefit greatly from its victory. The "proletarian" classes certainly have some cause for frustration and resentment, but proletarian groups have been found on both sides of the struggle. Tendencies toward "bureaucratism" and "revisionism" are real, but are extremely difficult to associate with a class base. The much maligned "bourgeoisie" is now, after more than a decade of Socialist construction, a shadow class which simply cannot exert the influence attributed to it. Thus, loyalty to Mao, rather than a clear desire for radical change, has probably been the overriding motive in determining support for the campaign. Political opportunism has also played a part, as has a willingness to believe the worst of anyone associated with the "revisionist" epithet. Idealistic conviction

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the Cultural Revolution was necessary to keep China safe for communism has been strongest among the younger students, but they, too, have found it difficult to know precisely what to do about it.

One is left with the conclusion that the primary justification for the Cultural Revolution was the perpetuation of Mao's prestige and leadership style. There is great irony in this, for in the long run he may lose on both counts. His style was not likely to survive in any case, but his prestige might have endured indefinitely, and undiminished, if he had accepted a quiet transformation of his teachings. Now, he has linked his prestige so closely with his style, and so sharpened the confrontation between himself and those who would refine his approach, that some explicit diminution of his image in the future appears probable.

SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT III

Blind Stakes in the Poker Game

KARL M. RUPPENTHAL

This article concludes Mr. Ruppenthal's discussion of the problems surrounding the projected supersonic airliner. The previous articles in the series were "Billion-Dollar Dilemma," May 22, and "Heat, Cold, Radiation & the Boom," May 29.

Impressive technical obstacles must be overcome, large amounts of money must be spent, and economic risks of unknown dimensions must be assumed before the United States can produce a supersonic transport that will cruise at Mach 3, that is, at three times the speed of sound. One set of technical problems stems from the fact that presently developed aluminum alloys will not tolerate the high temperatures that would be developed at such speeds. That being the case, why must the plane go so fast? What would happen if the United States should content itself with craft that would fly, say, in the range of Mach 2 or Mach 2.2?

That same question was asked by the British-French combine when it first entertained thoughts of building an SST, and early studies convinced them that they should content themselves with an aircraft capable of flying at a little more than twice the speed of the present subsonic jets. They came to that conclusion principally because aircraft speeds on the order of Mach 2 will produce the highest surface temperatures that aluminum alloys at present available can accept over long periods of time.

Once the builders of the Concorde decided to limit its speed, a host of troublesome problems were eliminated. They did not have to learn how to fabricate titanium or other exotic metals. They did not have to worry about using large amounts of heavy stainless steel. Because of its size, configuration and speed, the sonic boom that the Concorde will produce may be somewhat less intense than must be anticipated by the builders of the Mach 3 SST. Since it would cruise at a lower altitude (probably 60,000 feet instead of 80,000 feet), radiation hazards may be reduced. The risks of explosive depressurization would be a little smaller, and a lighter, less expensive back-up system for pressurizing the cabin will therefore be acceptable.

There is no doubt that from a technical standpoint it would be a great deal easier for the U. S. aircraft industry to build a Mach 2 transport than it will be to build one for Mach 3. But it is not at all certain that such an aircraft could be an economic success.

Probably the most impressive argument for not building a plane that will cruise on the order of Mach 2 is that the Concorde will get there first. The British-French combine began to develop their aircraft several years before studies of supersonic commercial fight were undertaken in this country. And even with its time advantage there is no assurance that the British-French Concorde will be an economic success. When the initial Anglo-French agreement was signed in November, 1962, it was estimated that the taxpayers of each country would be required to contribute on the order of $225 million. But as the plane went from the drawing board to a secondary state, the cost estimates rose and within two years they had almost doubled. In July, 1964, the best estimates indicated that development costs would approach $800 million.

The public knows little about the efforts made in Britain and in France to broaden the base of the project and thus share the risks. Some of the proponents of the airplane thought that it might become a full-fledged NATO venture. Others hoped for cooperation at least from the United States. But no strong expressions of interest came from either the American Government or the American aircraft industry. Both the Italian and the German Governments made polite responses to overtures, but they showed no active interest. The net result of the various talks was that Britain and France decided to carry the burden by themselves.

When his government took office in England, Harold Wilson was faced with a host of problems including inflation, unemployment, a balance-of-payments deficit, and severe pressure on the pound. Although there was no simple answer to England's complex problems, Wilson knew that the country could not afford to spend money on projects that were ill conceived or unduly expensive. He was concerned that the Concorde endeavor would be classified eventually in both categories.

Wilson and his advisers studied the Concorde project carefully in 1964, and satisfied themselves that the market for the plane had been wildly overestimated, that the project was unduly expensive, and that Britain

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

could not afford it. Many members of Parliament believed that the aircraft had little economic potential. Because of its limited range, there were severe doubts that the plane could even fly nonstop from Paris to New York with a full load of passengers (the specifications of the plane have since been somewhat modified). Because its range would be far less than that of the subsonic jets, its usefulness would be limited.

The plane was originally scheduled to sell for about $16 million but better cost estimates indicated that if there were to be any possibility of recovering the tremendous investments, an additional $5 million or $6 million should be added to the price tag of each plane. But even at $20 million per plane, there was considerable doubt that enough of them could be sold for the project ever to break even.

Said James Callaghan, Chancellor of the Exchequer: "1964 was a year of reckoning for a decade of mistaken policies and false pride." The British Minister of Aviation, Roy Jenkins, concurred: "If we were convinced that the investment in Concorde from our point of view and from the French point of view would help pay our way in the world consistent with the amount of money spent on it, then of course, we would have to go ahead. But at the moment we have our doubts."

As one move to stop wasteful expenditures and prop up a shaky economy, the Wilson government decided to cancel the project. The London *Observer* wrote an obituary that American proponents of the SST might do well to read thoughtfully today: "The simplest reason for cancelling the Concorde is that its chances of commercial success have become extremely slender. It is already bigger, heavier, noisier, and far more expensive than when it was first conceived. . . . The odds are that, having paid for its construction, the taxpayer would have to subsidize its operations and put up with its sonic boom as well. The aircraft industry will not be restored to economic health by being paid to develop an unsuccessful aircraft."

The British announcement reverberated far beyond the aviation community. There were clear indications that cancellation would result in major damage to already fragile Anglo-French relations. *The Wall Street Journal* thought "it would be considered by France's de Gaulle as a stab in the back and as proof that Britain still wants to behave as a non-European island. The French President undoubtedly would charge that the British walkout would amount to sabotage and would leave the door open to American domination of Europe's aviation for years to come. Already the Labour government has had to deny rumors prevalent here and in France that it entered into a 'deal' with the U. S. to back out of the Concorde project in return for U. S. support of the 15 per cent surcharge it recently imposed on imports of manufactured goods."

There were reports that de Gaulle was prepared to retaliate in other areas. There might be unusual construction delays in the long proposed tunnel beneath the English Channel. Britain's application to join the Common Market might be put on ice. The fact of the matter was that France could not afford to go it alone.

"France is barely on speaking terms with Britain as a result of Mr. Wilson's handling of the 'Concorde affair,'" reported the *U. S. News & World Report*. "Without sounding out the French, the British made a spectacular announcement indicating that they had decided to write off the Concorde supersonic airliner. . . . Mr. Wilson is having second thoughts about that decision, inasmuch as the French have threatened to go to the World Court and seek heavy damages from Britain for violating a contract that has no cancellation clause."

In the face of this pressure from its partner England reversed its decision, but the fact remains that the British economists were undoubtedly correct. While there



All Out For The SST Race . . .

Ben Roth Agency

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is some chance that the Concorde may be able to pay its own immediate costs of operation—fuel, maintenance wages and the like—there is virtually no possibility that the project as a whole will be self-liquidating or that the British and French taxpayers will be repaid for their investment. And Sir William Hildred, for years director general of the International Air Transport Association, maintains that a slight divergence from the confident predictions of the SST engineers could wreck the economic picture. Should there be restrictions on night operations or should circuitous routings be required because of the noise, the projected solvency of SST operations could quickly convert into losses."

The financial risks involved in the development of any supersonic transport, be it Mach 2 or Mach 3, are so large that no single aircraft company could undertake them. Karl G. Harr, Jr., president of the Aerospace Industries Association, has stated that the development would be impossible without substantial government assistance, and that view is shared by almost every responsible financial executive who has yet spoken on the subject. Indeed the cost is so large and the risks are so great that neither Britain nor France seriously thought of the SST as a single-nation project. Of all the countries in the world, probably only the United States and Russia have the requisite resources to produce the SST on their own. That fact raises interesting questions concerning the appropriate role of the United States Government in the project.

While the federal government has always indicated interest in advancing the nation's transport facilities by subsidies of one kind or another, never before in history has an agency of the government undertaken such an important role in a transport project of this magnitude. It is clear already that if the SST is to be built in the United States within the next decade, the principal financial backers of the project will not be a consortium of financial institutions and Wall Street bankers but the taxpayers. It also seems inevitable that some government agency—probably the FAA—will be the general contractor on the project. After all, it was the Federal Aviation Agency (and not the airlines that will buy the planes) which decided that the supersonic transport should be assembled by Boeing and its engines produced by General Electric. And while the various airlines have advised on the specifications for the aircraft, the FAA will have the final say. Thus, it might be said that the government has already become the project's banker and its general contractor. Now it is about to become architect for the project as well. Through the CAB, the government already has the power to determine fare levels, and as the principal investor the FAA may well set the price that will be paid for the plane.

There are also indications that in some respects the FAA is the principal promoter. On March 2, 1967, *The Wall Street Journal* reported that President Johnson might request additional funds for the project so that it could proceed closer to Phase III—the actual building of two test models and a flight test program of 100 hours. But before requesting an additional $200 million, said the *Journal*, Mr. Johnson wanted the airlines to indicate greater interest in the project through a contribution to research and development costs. "In a surprise move the FAA began early last month [February, 1967] to try persuading them to contribute $1 million of risk capital for each of the 57 planes they've tentatively ordered."

In a report to its stockholders, dated March 24, TWA stated the matter as follows: "TWA has made down payments of $1,000,000 to the Federal Aviation Agency for the purpose of reserving delivery positions for ten supersonic transport aircraft to be built by United States manufacturers under a program sponsored by the United States Government. . . . At the request of the Federal Government, TWA has agreed . . . to participate in a plan for financing the development of two U. S. supersonic transport prototype aircraft. The agreement provides that in the event the Government and The Boeing Company enter into contract before December 1, 1967 for such research and development work, TWA will pay [$10,000,000 to Boeing]. . . . The funds to be paid by TWA will be at a total risk. These amounts will not under any circumstances be returned to TWA. . . . Other U. S. carriers holding delivery positions have been requested to make similar commitments. . . ."

This position may well be typical for the industry; however, World Airways, which has placed tentative orders for three of the SSTs, declined to follow suit. Edward J. Daley, president, said in a letter to FAA Administrator General William F. McKee that if World were to set aside $3 million of its funds now as "risk capital" for SST development, its present subsonic jet acquisition program could be seriously hampered.

Following up on the story, *The Wall Street Journal* reported: "A large carrier is said to have entered the talks [with the FAA] with a list of qualifications, including a request that the Government accept a formula whereby the airlines would receive $3 million eventually for each $1 million invested, if the plane were successful." The attractiveness of this proposed arrangement may not be evident to the principal backers—the taxpayers of the United States.

Not yet fully explored is the government's role as a possible insurer of the supersonic craft. As long as the plane remains on the ground, insurance questions are relatively mundane. It is simply a matter of determining how much insurance should prudently be provided against various hazards that are known to be possible.

But once the plane is in the air there is as yet no real measure of the risks to which the operating airline may be exposed. It would be difficult enough to handle passengers' claims for alleged injury through radiation, faulty pressurization and other phenomena. But what about possible claims that may arise from aircraft accidents and the effects of the sonic boom? The dimensions of this problem are so widespread that several unorthodox solutions have been suggested.

One is that claims for damage resulting from sonic boom be severely restricted by legislation—a course of action that would be unpopular, to say the least. Another proposal is that the government simply underwrite the risks. Should that course of action be followed, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government of the United States would automatically, nd perhaps inadvertently, find itself in the insurance usiness, and in a very substantial way.

As the day of supersonic decision approaches, ıe level of government in-fighting has increased. While ıost of the early government-generated publicity came rom protoganists of the SST, some of their detractors re now on the stage. Their position was reported by Fred .. Zimmerman in *The Wall Street Journal*:

> "It is remarkable that this project has got as far as it has," complains an economist familiar with the project. Part of the explanation, he asserts, is that most public and Congressional discussion so far has been based on pro-SST material widely circulated by the FAA, while government critics of the program have been "placed under constraint."
>
> Few administration SST experts still believe the FAA's claim of total objectivity about the project. This claim has long irritated SST critics, who have argued there is a basic conflict of interest, in that the FAA is running the project and yet will have responsibility for certifying that the SSTs are safe for passenger service. In effect, charges one critic, "the FAA will be asked to certify that it has spent its money wisely and that its own technical judgment is sound."

While economic questions in themselves are not always simple, aircraft economics are also intertwined in ɔalance-of-payments questions. Roy H. Nickerson, vice ɔresident in charge of the Aerospace and Electronics Department of the First National City Bank, said at a ɔanking forum in 1965 that a failure of the U. S. to get ı supersonic transport into the air by 1972 could add a ıtaggering $10 billion to our balance of payments de-ficit in the 1970s. As an aside, he pointed out that the ıerospace and electronics industries had met favorable rade balances of some $1.7 billion in 1964.

"That could be wiped out if the U. S. fails to de-iver a supersonic jet to market within two years after the British-French Concorde begins flying. A longer ead than that, some industry experts fear, would siphon off much of the business that the U. S. might normally get," said Dennis Duggan in the now defunct New York *Herald Tribune*.

But the SST detractors are not satisfied with these figures. They suspect that considerable double counting is involved, that SST proponents may rest their predictions on the assumption that without the SST U. S. aircraft exports would nose-dive. They contend that if the United States exports many supersonic craft, it may find itself substituting them for subsonic transports, which are at present an export item of considerable importance. Also largely ignored in the calculations is the fact that if the SST manages to induce large numbers of passengers to fly to the far corners of the earth, many of those passengers will be Americans. The amount of money brought in by the sale of supersonic aircraft could be far overshadowed by the dollars that U. S. travelers would spend abroad.

Zimmerman, reporting again in *The Wall Street Journal*, became acidic:

> Economic studies done by several outside research concerns and just delivered to the FAA are so critical of the project's optimistic financial assumptions—including those about market demand, likely fare levels, and the balance-of-payments effect—that the FAA has decided to keep them secret.
>
> When the FAA commissioned the studies last year at a cost of more than $650,000, it is understood to have said it would make them public when completed. But as it began receiving the reports and discovered almost all conclusions were unfavorable to the SST, it quickly stamped them "for official use only."
>
> "Anything that's been done in this area is for controlled distribution only," explains an FAA spokesman in refusing to let a reporter see the studies. "This means the reports are available only to people who establish a 'need to know.'" It's believed that in the past few days the FAA decided this "need to know" didn't extend to several Congressmen, including some members of the House Appropriations Committee, and at least one powerful Democratic Senator, all of whom were denied access to the reports.

Zimmerman quoted one person in the Administration as saying: "We all agree there's absolutely no economic justification for building this plane." "This thing could become the FAA's Edsel," said another. "Among those to whom this may come as a shock," said Zimmerman, "are the members of Congress who have appropriated $511 million since 1962 for developing the plane, partly because of unequivocal assurances from the FAA that the SST would be a bonanza for the U. S. balance-of-payments position, while being highly profitable for the airlines to operate. . . ."

Several months after *The Wall Street Journal* complained of the official secrecy surrounding the project, the FAA made public several of the studies that had previously been classified. Now that there is less uncertainty concerning probable costs, a gigantic poker game is beginning to take shape. Participants include the U. S. aircraft industry, the Anglo-French builders of the Concorde, the conservationists, property owners on the boom paths and the taxpayers. Some of the players hold impressive cards and an imposing stack of chips. Others, less well heeled, are skillful players who seldom lose in this game. Some players are eager, while others have been reluctantly drawn into the game. And sitting quietly in the background another potential participant, Russia, silently eyes the table.

The stakes are high: several billion dollars in government contracts, billions of dollars in wages and several thousand jobs. At stake, too, are elements of national pride and technical leadership.

But also to be considered are important questions about the living qualities of the earth: how much noise should be tolerated, and who is competent to set the levels? What would be the impact of the supersonic transport upon all of the peoples of the world? And who is to decide whether it would be desirable? The full importance of the supersonic decision is just beginning to unfold. Far more is involved than the aircraft industry itself, or travel itself. Political, economic and social questions of considerable magnitude have yet to be assessed. Far more discussion is indicated before we undertake a project that promises literally to shake the world.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS & THE ARTS

The Nonpersonality Cult

KHRUSHCHEV. *By Mark Frankland. Introduction by Harry Schwartz. Stein and Day. 213 pp. $6.95.*

ALEXANDER WERTH

Only on those rare days when there is an election in Moscow do we get any news of Nikita Khrushchev. Western correspondents (and particularly Henry Shapiro of United Press, who was a great favorite of Mr. K.) hang round the polling station in the district where he lives, to exchange a few words with him. We learned, on the most recent of such occasions, that Mr. K. had grown much older and thinner, and that, when asked how he was, he is reported to have shrugged his shoulders, and remarked with a touch of bitter humor: "Oh, what does it matter to you? I'm just an old-age pensioner, like millions of others." So we know that Mr. K. (who was 73 on April 17) is still alive, and is living in moderate comfort in Moscow. As far as the Soviet press is concerned, however, he might not exist—and might never have existed; Stalin is sometimes mentioned, usually in an unfavorable context; but Mr. K. hardly ever. In the Stalin days, Communist leaders who had fallen from grace were usually shot; but to be killed by silence must be almost equally galling, especially for so extroverted and ebullient a person as Khrushchev, who literally dominated the Russian political scene for more than ten years, and was his own top publicity agent.

But the Western world has not forgotten him. We have had several books on Khrushchev in recent years. Some, like George Paloczi-Horvath's, represent him as one of the most evil accomplices in "Stalin's crimes." Others, like Edward Crankshaw's, treat him almost as an angel of light, compared with the ogre who had ruled Russia during the previous twenty-five years. Now we have a new book on Khrushchev by Mark Frankland, a former Moscow correspondent of the London *Observer* which is, in some ways, more satisfactory than the others. It avoids the all-black and all-white approach; shows that Khrushchev was neither a saint nor an archvillain; and places the Stalin period in good historical perspective.

Unlike other Western writers, Frankland is conscious of the danger of allowing "Stalin's barbarism to dominate our image of the Soviet Union from the 1930's on." For him, the history of the Stalin years is "like two halves of a puzzle that can never be made to fit together. There is the positive side—the great work of building the foundations of a new society. But there is also the purposeful disregard for human life that in the 1930s assumed a dimension beyond ordinary human cruelty." To stress only one side and ignore the other is to misrepresent history; and it is only by taking full account of both halves of the "puzzle" that, in Frankland's view, the whole story of Nikita Khrushchev begins to make sense.

Frankland also shows commendable modesty. Not a Kremlinologist in the pejorative sense, he admits that any biography of a Soviet leader "must be very tentative indeed," since "most of the material on which biographies are usually based—such as private letters and diaries—is simply unavailable." And in his chapters on the postwar Stalin period, describing how Zhdanov, Khrushchev, Malenkov and others were jockeying for position, his frequent use of phrases like "it is possible," "it is likely," "the odds are that . . ." —makes it clear that his stories are based not on any written or printed material but on no more than intelligent guesswork. Even when he does produce what looks like hard facts, their sources are often, in my view, very far from reliable—particularly the "revelations" by ax-grinding Yugoslavs like Djilas and Dedijer.

Despite these limitations, most of which Frankland himself admits, he has written a biography of Khrushchev which makes better sense than most.

Unlike Lenin, Trotsky and even Stalin, Khrushchev was in no way an intellectual, let alone a learned Marxist; during the Civil War, when he was a sort of political commissar of the lowest rank in the Red Army, he was still scarcely literate. But he had seen life in the raw as a youth; he regarded the "foreign capitalists" who controlled many of the Donbas mines and factories as "enemies of the Russian people" who paid their workers miserable wages, and treated Russia little better than the Congo. (Actually, Khrushchev tended to exaggerate these horrors in retrospect; the Donbas miners enjoyed a certain degree of capitalist paternalism and, as Lenin himself wrote, received much better wages than the workers in the more archaic Urals industries.) What also made a great impression on young Khrushchev's mind was the military aid given to the Whites by the "Western imperialists"; this aid was insufficient and halfhearted but it prolonged the Civil War, and intensified that economic chaos from which Russia was to suffer for years after, culminating in the fearful famines of 1920 to 1922.

Frankland suggests that, for a few years, young Khrushchev's adherence to the Bolshevik party remains uncertain; he may even have been, at the early stages of the Revolution, more sympathetic to the Mensheviks or the Social-Revolutionaries. But in any case, he became a good Bolshevik soon after, and when the Civil War was over, he had the good luck of being regarded as a sufficiently reliable member of the rank and file to be admitted to one of the Ukrainian *rabfacs,* those "Workers' Faculties," which "remedied his almost total lack of formal education" and "provided men like him with a crash course in basic subjects before they went on to specialist studies." Neither his loyalty to the regime—after his experiences in the Civil War—nor his proletarian origin was in doubt; and men like him (he was 28 by 1922) were needed to provide a new class of Soviet specialists. Khrushchev owed his rapid promotion on the local (Ukrainian) level to none other than Lazar Kaganovich —his future victim—already Stalin's hatchet man in the Ukraine:

> Khrushchev was exactly the sort of man that Kaganovich was seeking to promote in the Ukrainian hierarchy. Men like Khrushchev were malleable precisely because their approach to Bolshevism was not intellectual, because they knew nothing of the pre-revolutionary world of Bolshevism. Stalin's gradual destruction of all opposition meant little to such men. . . . Khrushchev eagerly endorsed all Stalin's attacks on his opponents. . . . In 1926 he attacked Trotsky and Zinoviev. . . . In 1929 he attacked Bukharin at the 2nd Ukrainian Party Conference.

In the early 1930s, Khrushchev's rise became spectacular; Kaganovich took

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

him to Moscow where, in 1933, he became his number-two man in the Moscow city party; two years later he succeeded Kaganovich as head of the party for the whole Moscow region, and was also elected to the Central Committee; during the years that followed the two men were associated with that spectacular enterprise, the building of the Moscow subway.

Some of the best passages in Frankland's book deal with the spirit of Russia's "Iron Age"—the industrialization of Russia under the first three Five-Year Plans:

> The heroism of this period was central to the experience of the men in Khrushchev's generation. . . . Although some Party members revolted against the ruthlessness of these [Stalin's] policies, it is not hard to understand how many believed them justified. The vision of a mighty Russia . . . appealed powerfully to both the Russian and the communist mind. . . . The fear that the capitalist states might attack Russia . . . seemed doubly justified by the birth and growth of Nazi Germany. Stalin's policy to make the Soviet Union strong . . . seemed literally a matter of life and death.

This obsession with Nazi Germany goes a long way to explain not only Khrushchev's total loyalty to Stalin and his ready acceptance of the purges but, more significantly, his unenviable role as "the butcher of the Ukraine" in the late 1930s. There were many "disloyal" elements in the Ukraine, especially after the collectivization which had been particularly fierce in that country but, worse still, it was the part of the Soviet Union in which Hitler, with his *Lebensraum* claims, was specially interested.

Not only did Khrushchev hound Ukrainian "nationalists" and "separatists" but he also made a serious effort to restore agriculture and stock breeding; he was at least partly successful in this, and thus acquired in Moscow his reputation as an "agricultural expert." The grain problem, at any rate, was solved by 1939, largely as a result of Khrushchev's technique of expanding the network of party organizations in the Ukrainian countryside; in 1938, he had been promoted to candidate membership of the Politburo. This chapter on Khrushchev as the essentially *Russian* boss of the Ukraine is interesting, though Frankland tends to pull his punches in dealing with the even greater ruthlessness Khrushchev showed in his handling of the Western Ukraine, when the Russians took it over in 1939, as a result of the partition of Poland.

In his chapter describing Khrushchev during the war, Frankland covers what is mostly familiar ground; but here he puts forward the theory that it was during these years that Khrushchev first lost faith in the "infallibility" of Stalin; for he had suffered directly from some of the major errors Stalin had committed as commander in chief. In his description of the early post-Stalin period, Frankland says little or nothing about the liquidation of the camps and the abolition of the NKVD's Forced Labor Empire. Yet it is this, and the "restoration of Socialist legality" which (though not solely Khrushchev's work) laid the real foundations for his rapidly growing popularity in the country, and prepared it psychologically for the 20th Congress of 1956 and for the famous "secret report." This report on "Stalin's crimes threw Russia into a fever"; and as we know, its effect on the outside world, particularly on Poland and Hungary, was even more violent. As a result, the opposition to Khrushchev grew, and he did not regain his balance until he had liquidated the "Anti-Party Group" in 1957.

It was in 1957-58 that Khrushchev virtually became the ruler of Russia; he not only took credit for the sputniks but also for the bumper harvest of 1958, when the Virgin Lands proved—at first—an enormous success. Khrushchev reached the height of internal popularity and world fame in 1959, a year marked by his famous trip to the United States. All seemed to be going well: Russia appeared, technically, ahead of the United States; economically, things were better in Russia than ever before; communism, with its unequaled prosperity, seemed in sight. Khrushchev boasted of "outstripping America" in the per capita output of food within a very short time, and of "burying" capitalism under the mountains of this unprecedented affluence of Communist Russia. Frankland argues that Khrushchev firmly believed that world communism would result from this prosperity. But did he? It is hard to believe that whatever his boasts he was not conscious at heart of the geographical and climatic handicaps inherent in Soviet agriculture.

In any case, the crazy improvisations and furious outbursts by which Khrushchev's agricultural "policies" were marked during the last four years of his rule suggest that he was desperate in his realization that his exuberant optimism of 1958-59 was unfounded. The 1963 harvest proved a disaster. By depriving China of technical aid in 1960

MUSIC OVER WORDS

Connotations, I do not want the connotations of words.
Suddenly they are gross, they get in the way of feeling.
It is all too difficult to be ambiguous
And struggle in meshes of the intellectual.

Nakedness! Purity! Ecstasy of sound!
Sound that ravishes me entirely, joyfully,
You take me back to the beginnings of man
Before he could articulate his deep confusions.

Every fiber of my body needs to salute you.
Direct and passionate you speak to me overwhelmingly,
How could we have gone so far in the funereal?
Paean! I wake to life when I hear music weaving!

Let the dead have their memorial syllables,
Perfect stone poems in gardens of perfect stone.
With you I writhe in the struggle of humanity,
Music, lift me to heaven, descend me to hell.

Music, secrete in me your strange dynamism.
In this dynamism I surge and lunge, and strike
Fate. You make me want to judge mankind,
Raising me to the height of vision.

Music then play the long drawn-out fantasy
Of the completest contact of tactile reality
And while you are flowing like the oceans in a great storm
I live in the height of danger and authority.

RICHARD EBERHART

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(he did this without consulting anybody), he made an enemy of that country. His "coexistence" with America suffered one setback after another—partly owing to American bad faith (the U-2 incident), partly to Khrushchev's own errors of judgment (the Cuban missile crisis). The test-ban treaty of 1963 was not enough to save Khrushchev. His cultural policy was so incoherent that he lost the support of the intelligentsia. By 1964 he had antagonized not only it but also the heavily taxed peasantry, the working class (who were short of food, and had to pay high prices for what little was available), the Chinese and, finally, even the Czechs and Poles when he sent his son-in-law on an unofficial mission to West Germany, thus by-passing Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Frankland touches on most of these points. Apart from the animosity Khrushchev had created among his colleagues on the Presidium, there was also another factor which greatly contributed to the atmosphere in which his elimination in October, 1964, was possible — and, indeed, easy. And that was the *general* discontent in the country over shortages, over the emptiness of Khrushchev's promises and extravagant boasts, besides the growing uneasiness over the new "personality cult." I remember the angry shoulder shrug with which, two months before Khrushchev's fall, a Leningrad editor openly complained to me that he had to put another Khrushchev picture on his front page, and "fill up nearly the whole of the paper with more of his crap on agriculture."

Today, more than three years after his fall, Khrushchev remains a puzzling and rather fascinating figure—good and bad, shrewd and stupid, subtle and clumsy, cautious and reckless. Have things greatly changed in Russia since his fall? In his introduction, Mr. Schwartz says they haven't. Like Khrushchev, Kosygin, he says, believes in coexistence abroad and prosperity at home. But there are, surely, some major differences. The *style* of governing Russia has changed; Khrushchev's improvisations have given way to more efficient methods; the boasting about outstripping America and the "inevitable" advent of world communism have been replaced by a more sober assessment of Russia and the world. The cultural policy (witness the Siniavsky-Daniel trial) has not improved. But there is a marked desire to come to terms with America and especially with Western Europe and to accept the "Gaullist" idea that Russia is "part of Europe" and even—as Andrei Voznesensky suggested in a recent poem —the shield that will protect Europe against Asia. This *rapprochement* with Western Europe is something new. At heart, Khrushchev took only America seriously. At least as long as the war in Vietnam lasts, Kosygin will look for friends and economic partners elsewhere —in Britain, in France, in Italy. Today, Khrushchev's patronage of the Third World is being pursued halfheartedly. "Friends" like Nkrumah and Ben Bella have been eliminated; Indonesia is in a mess, and the Russians are not even sure where they stand with Castro. While throwing anxious glances at China, they want, above all, to cultivate their own garden — an astonishing offspring of Marxism-Leninism in the nuclear era. But will history — and the Pentagon — allow them to?

The Politics of Art

THE REACTIONARIES, Yeats, Lewis, Pound, Eliot, Lawrence: A Study of the Anti-Democratic Intelligentsia. *By John R. Harrison. Introduction by William Empson. Schocken Books. 224 pp. $6.*

SHERMAN PAUL

Mr. Paul teaches English at the University of Iowa. His most recent book is Edmund Wilson: A Study of Literary Vocation in Our Time *(University of Illinois Press). He is also the author of* Louis Sullivan: An Architect in American Thought *(Prentice-Hall).*

There was never any question that these writers—and much of the modernism to which they heavily contributed—were reactionary, and Mr. Harrison adduces familiar literary evidence. The still troublesome question, which makes his forthright examination and judgment of these writers so challenging and significant, concerns the relation of a writer's politics (social and cultural sentiments, political views and action) to his art (aesthetic principles and practice). We seldom raise this question because we have been taught by these as well as other writers, whose views still dominate the literary world and the classroom, that art is separable from life, and superior to it. In our worry over mass culture we may speak now of the "politics of culture," but it is not yet fashionable to speak of the politics of art—or to think of the artist as seriously engaged in the affairs of society.

There has been, increasingly, an expression of discontent with the modernist sensibility, but except for Edmund Wilson in *Axel's Castle* (1931), no one until now has so fully addressed himself to the implications of this sensibility for politics. Wilson impugned the writer's withdrawal from the world of affairs and proposed a close alignment of imagination and politics—made art an instrument of social engineering, and tributary to man. But because Wilson's book introduced writers such as Yeats, Valéry and Eliot to a wide audience, it did more to further symbolist views of the autonomy and supremacy of art than hinder them. So did the actual politics of art of the 1930s and early 1940s, and since that time we have been wary of any such alliance. Only now, stirred by the activism and protest of a new generation of writers, have we been willing again to admit that art, inevitably, has political aspects. This is what Harrison,

I WANT TO HELP BUILD A HUMAN BRIDGE TO RUSSIA WITH CITIZEN EXCHANGE CORPS This Summer

Send me **FREE** reprints of N. Y. Times editorials telling how **CITIZEN EXCHANGE CORPS (CEC)**, a non-political, non-profit organization acts to implement **Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson's policy of "Building Bridges" to Russia.** Tell me how I can participate this summer in a 3 week CEC program of people-to-people contact and seminars that is open to Americans of all ages and occupations. **AND . . . HOW THIS PROGRAM CAN BE A MAJOR STEP TOWARD PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR.**

3 WEEK EXCHANGE VISITS LEAVE NEW YORK CITY
July 14 — Aug. 5 — Aug. 26 or Meet CEC in Moscow

Name .....
Address .....
City .....
State ..... Zip .....

Mail to:
CITIZEN EXCHANGE CORPS.
550 Fifth Ave. (Dept. N-11)
New York City 10036

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VISITING ITALY

We are tired of this art that is never finished!
Mosaics that describe the approaching fall,
The hot streets that never ended,
Whorls in wine-pots,
Bits of time scattered everywhere,
Like hairs from the barbarians sleeping under the arena floor.
Pale and exhausted torsos,
Long arms reaching into the ocean of nothing,
Arenas that hold only dark corridors and galleries rushing through the air two stories up,
Air like the acid breath of the lions
That has wiped out the faces of all the statues.

ROBERT BLY

a young British scholar of this generation, insists on; and his book, which scrutinizes the politics of these writers and tests them against the standards of liberal democracy, may be taken as a sign—favorable, I think—of the changing social and intellectual climate.

In the years since *Axel's Castle* we have come to see more clearly that the symbolist view of art and the kinds of repudiation represented by it may underwrite the mentality of fascism; and we have come to see that those who upheld such aesthetic doctrines were often political in their concern for power and leadership. We do not think of these writers, as Van Wyck Brooks narrowly did as early as the 1920s, as "coterie" writers, or vilify them as "life-deniers" even though in the battle between Culture and life, which Ortega said was the theme of our time, they stood in many respects for Culture and turned to past achievements for solutions to present needs. We have come to understand them, to understand how much their response measures the inadequate solution of modern problems, and sometimes we even share their distaste for what Yeats called "this filthy modern tide." But in light of the record—not only of actions like Pound's but of the often virulent content of their work—we may readily assent to Julian Benda's prediction that "this denunciation of liberalism, notably by the vast majority of contemporary men of letters, will be one of the things in this age most astonishing to history."

The modernist sensibility is defined by its anti-modernism, by its repugnance to the many forces in our time that have brought change and instability. It has shaped itself against democracy (parliaments, pluralism, humanitarianism, the masses); against science, industrialism, and sometimes capitalism, and against secularism (humanism, relativism, historicism, rationalism). Mr. Empson, in his introduction, says that it leads to a "cult of Unnaturalism"—and it does, countering what it considers the "softness" of its arch-foe naturalism with "hard" modes of thought whose authoritarian and closed character is sometimes supported by religion. This sensibility is not a sport or the possession of literary men alone. It is a frequent phenomenon, as Harrison explains, of 19th-century and recent history, a familiar reaction to all sorts of displacements and dispossessions. And as Benda's statement and Harrison's "social surprise" (the phrase is Empson's) indicate, it is not the illiberalism, the preference for "cruel, authoritarian, bellicose society," that is astonishing but rather the connection of writers with it.

In studying this relationship Harrison has followed the kind of engaged sociology of literature one finds in Raymond Williams' *Culture and Society,* and in some respects his study is a supplement to it. His directive is taken from Orwell: "a writer's political and religious beliefs are not excrescences to be laughed away, but something that will leave their mark even on the smallest detail of his work." He is not wholly successful, I think, in finding such substantiating elements of style—the result perhaps of thinking T. E. Hulme's definitions of "geometric" and "vital" art sufficient proof, and of overlooking the most brilliant study of modernist form and thought, Joseph Frank's *The Widening Gyre.*

But Harrison is successful in taking seriously a writer's political and religious beliefs and, like Raymond Williams, in putting before us the *content* of a writer's work. And what is very much his own is the critical tact with which he treats his subjects and the value of human sympathy by which he finally judges them: "The ultimate argument is one of sympathy. It is impossible to prove scientifically that it is right to respect other people and treat them humanely, and wrong to hate and terrorize them. To have sympathy for one's fellow human beings, whether individually or in the mass, seems to me to be an eminently desirable human quality. There is little doubt that the writers here discussed were lacking in this quality."

The virtues of sanity, decency and honesty that inform this statement inform Harrison's book and more than compensate for the lack of incisiveness in conception and style, the sketchiness, and the occasional naïveté (Hemingway's "main interests in life were big-game hunting and bull-fighting"—"Jews are not only good at finance; probably no race is more widely gifted"). The most serious deficiencies, I think, are due simply to insufficient reading and meditation: for example, the failure in the case of Lawrence to consider his contest with Whitman ("I am he attesting sympathy") over the claims of aristocracy and democracy; the failure to consider in writers other than Lawrence the connection between their sexual and political attitudes; and the failure to set these writers against a foil, a peer in art such as Joyce, who in depicting Bloom (". . . it's no use, says he. Force, hatred, history, all that. That's not life for men and women, insult and hatred") discounted almost everything the reactionaries stood for.

JAMES DICKEY
POEMS
1957-1967

"the work of a . . . major poet. . . . I have no doubt that it will prove to be the outstanding collection of one man's poems to appear in this decade." — LOUIS UNTERMEYER, *Saturday Review*

"James Dickey is a good poet, very good." — MICHAEL GOLDMAN, *The Nation*

"he has achieved a remarkable and deserved popularity." — WILLIAM MEREDITH, *The N.Y. Times Book Review*

315 pages, $6.95

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY PRESS
Middletown, Conn. 06457

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Good, Dirty Fun and Games

SNOW WHITE. *By Donald Barthelme. Atheneum Publishers. 181 pp. $4.50.*

SHAUN O'CONNELL
Mr. O'Connell teaches English at the University of Massachusetts.

It's not Disney's *Snow White* (heigh-ho). That impinged. Nature out of whack—stepmother, half-men, domestically helpful wildlife, a poisoned apple, "death." Pity and terror. Then nature's healthy order re-established—the prince, bye-bye boys and birds, back to a castle. Catharsis. Disney whipped up a Jungian archetype for 7 year olds. Who—older, weightier, taxed and a bit puzzled by what's happening, baby—might be more put off than on by a Snow White who makes it in the shower with her munificent seven, wears People's Volunteer trousers or black vinyl pajamas and has anxiety hang-ups waiting for her prince to come.

But Barthelme doesn't want from us the investment which we so promiscuously gave Walt. We must be cool enough to get the games that are being played in his novel. Like Muckrake the Myths. Barthelme did this before in "The Joker's Greatest Triumph," making Batman vaguely faggy. Here Snow White is done in.

The witch figure, Jane Villiers de l'Isle-Adam, is prevented from poisoning Snow White with a vodka Gibson by the suddenly princely Paul, "a friend of the family," who downs it himself. Paul falls, and with him another of our treasured myths. (Saul Bellow has suggested that many Americans hide within them a "sealed treasure," some gem of culture like *Anna Karenina* or *Madame Bovary*. Barthelme suggests, with more persuasion, that the things we really treasure—which thus are worth evoking and debunking—are those great tawdry, lyrical, chintzy fantasies which exploited us when we were young.)

Or Identify that Allusion. After a marvelous list of princes who might come for her (Prince Andrey? Prince Philip? Prince Hal? Prince Matchabelli? Prince Valiant?) Snow White ponders, waiting in a lovely parody of Lorenz Hart. "But slash me if I will let it, this waiting, bring down my lofty feelings of anticipation from the bedroom ceiling where they dance overhead like so many French letters filled with lifting gas." After the halting, hyped-up rhetoric —making "this waiting" more visible by hanging it out in apposition—Hart's already strained conceit ("She dances overhead/ On the ceiling near my bed.") is overloaded with another analogy and the whole thing falls into bathos. Many allusions are word plays, like Woody Allen one-liners: "The Fire Next Time Bar & Grill"; Pete Seeger's "Where Have All The Flowers Gone?" get transformed in, "where have all the buffalo gone?" But other allusions have more ambitious reach.

Paul once considers joining "the President's war on poetry," a neat compression of the Shriver/Lowell sides of the President's mind. Snow White's seven make Chinese baby food (because there is now more money in this than in mining diamonds?), following the recipes of their father. " 'Try to be a man about whom nothing is known,' our father said, when we were young. Our father said several other interesting things, but we have forgotten what they were." (Henry James said, "try to be one of the people on whom nothing is lost!" This plea for perception is altered by Barthelme to fit themes of anonymity and alienation; whatever else James might have said is forgotten in this anti-traditional novel.) Sometimes significant, always funny, the allusions really serve a more important function; after the reader's long trips through odd syntax and weird doings they periodically refer him to a recognizable world only, of course, to show that what he thought was inviolable is now turvy-topsy.

This, then, is a nice product of the literature-as-fun-and-games persuasion. In these terms *Snow White* is beyond challenge; Barthelme has a raucous wit and talent to burn; the fun is good and dirty, the games are tricky. Barthelme could be discussed in the framework of anti-novel theory; the novel should give up introspection (Sarraute), should have no content (Robbe-Grillet), should not satisfy the reader's "passion to understand" (Sontag). But let that go. Barthelme is never so chilly and weighty as these theoreticians. He mocks himself (a built-in boring discussion of his own techniques and a questionnaire for audience responses) as Twain and West did, never goes wholly ga-ga for his own gimmicks as Burroughs does.

Even when we grudgingly grant that Barthelme has every right to do what he wants to Batman and Snow White (marry them off next?), does it follow that literature is merely *blague*? Or, to put it another way, in order for the artifice of literature to work, doesn't it have to break through its own arbitrary restrictions, create an illusion against its own illusion? All literature is a game. Of course. But to convince us that it is more than Monopoly a work has to impinge. Too abstract? Take *Lolita*. This is clearly a game. Nabokov takes a vile old nymph-lecher, doesn't gloss over the ugliness of what he is doing, but through the most marvelous rhetoric, both artificial and touching ("my dolorous and hazy darling"), gets so far inside Humbert Humbert that the reader is involved, implicated in his being, one with his terrible, lyrical lust. That's the game; but in order to make that game work we must be touched by the reality of what happened to Humbert and Lo.

Lolita may have begun as a literary experiment, but in order to prove the validity of the hypothesis the quick and the pain of life had to be touched in silly, pathetic H. H. and lost, lovely Lolita. "I insist the world know how much I loved my Lolita, *this* Lolita, pale and polluted, and big with another's child, but still gray-eyed, still sooty-lashed, still auburn and almond, still Carmencita, still mine." Humbert's love is wholly moving. If the anti-novel or the fun-and-games-novel disapprove of this stuff of life then they can march in the *avant-garde* fields, (no depth, no content, no goal) alone.

Yet Donald Barthelme knows more than just the games people play. Several stories in his first book, *Come Back, Dr. Caligari*, are wildly funny dramatizations of loony incidents in the service of sharp perceptions. In "Me and Miss Mandible" a 35-year-old failure—as soldier, husband and insurance adjuster—is returned to the sixth grade for retraining. This wacky

The Best Way To Get NATION

THE NATION 6-19-67
333 Sixth Ave., New York 10014

☐ One Year, $10
☐ Two Years, $18
☐ 6 Months, $6

☐ Bill Me ☐ Payment Enclosed

(Foreign and Canadian Postage $1 a year extra)

NAME .....

ADDRESS .....

CITY .....

STATE ..... ZIP NO. .....

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

remise is based upon an insight which s internally convincing, "the distinc-ion between children and adults, while robably useful for some purposes is t bottom a specious one, I feel. There re only individual egos, crazy for love." rom this conviction all else follows—eachers acting as "authorities" on a vorld they don't understand, children wisted with a Debbie-Eddie-Liz view of ove. In "A Shower of Gold" Barthelme urther dramatizes the sadism of an dult society whose entertainment is umiliating television "game" shows. fter careful consideration Peterson, a inor artist, decides that "the world s absurd," goes on a television program nd harangues his audience: "My mother vas a royal virgin . . . and my father a hower of gold. My childhood was pas-oral and energetic and rich in experi-nces which developed my character. As young man I was noble in reason, nfinite in faculty, in form express and admirable, and in apprehension. . . ." Then came "maturity" and an absurd world. *Snow White* is never up to these crazy-lovely stories, but it has its moments—Snow White's bitching about the ennui in being an American "horsewife," another's disquisition on the money that could be made in the manufacturing of "plastic buffalo humps," to help raise the per capita production of trash. "It's that we want to be on the leading edge of this trash phenomenon, the everted sphere of the future." But these moments don't cohere around a central vision; his "novel" remains a collection of wild and witty set pieces, often beautiful in themselves but, after the stories in *Come Back, Dr. Caligari,* disappointing. What is really worrisome is the thought that Barthelme might now—after Snow White, who?—consider this kind of story coherence too conventional. I—invoking the incontestable authority of Disney and Nabokov—hope not.


A daring vision of man's future — built on scientific fact, designed with all the drama and excitement of science fiction
EDEN WAS NO GARDEN
An Inquiry Into the Environment of Man
by NIGEL CALDER
$4.95 from your bookseller
HOLT, RINEHART AND WINSTON, INC.



FOR WRITERS!
Enrich your style through Herbert Spencer's and Edgar Allan Poe's classic principles that have influenced many of the world's great authors. A help for writers eager to get published. Send $1.00 to
PAGEANT PRESS
101 5th Ave. N.Y. 3 Dept. N

$2.95 each
SAVE YOUR COPIES OF *The* NATION
• Each file holds a full year's copies.
• Jesse Jones Volume Files for every publication.
• Covered in durable leather like Kivar, title embossed in 16 Kt gold.
Satisfaction guaranteed
Attractive and practical for your home or office
3 for $8.25
ORDER NOW — send check or money order.
MAGAZINE FILE CO.
520 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 36, N. Y.
FREE DESCRIPTIVE FOLDER UPON REQUEST

An Affair of Passion

THE CALIFORNIA OATH CONTROVERSY. *By David P. Gardner. University of California Press. 245 pp. $5.50.*

GEORGE R. STEWART

Mr. Stewart, professor emeritus of the University of California, is the author, among many other books, of The California Trial *(McGraw-Hill) and* Committee of Vigilance *(Houghton Mifflin). His* The Year of the Oath *(Doubleday) was written in collaboration with other professors of the University of California.*

n his opening sentence the author ex-ands upon his title and presents "the oyalty oath controversy that for three ears convulsed the largest university in ne nation." He means the University of California, and the years extend from 949 to 1952.

One wonders how many people, even hose of full maturity, still remember hat controversy. Much has happened ince. But during a trip to Europe in 951 I found that intellectuals in all ountries were interested and concerned bout the affair.

In any case, it is a fit subject for istorical review, and the present work s a valuable one. With a high degree f objectivity, it offers a detailed and ccurate account, based chiefly upon egential, administrative and faculty ecords. The author has also read private etters, diaries and memoranda, and has alked with many of the numerous still urviving leaders. His actual use of such nformal records, however, appears to be comparatively slight. Perhaps for this reason, the narrative gives little sense of immediacy, and the characters of the participants do not appear vividly. In general, the account might be called bureaucratic, keeping close to the documents and quoting often and voluminously.

No historian can be wholly objective, and Mr. Gardner guardedly states his own feelings, which seem to put him on the side of the faculty.

The book is admirable in the presentation and appraisal of the historical background of the times, when such names as McCarthy and Hiss were on everyone's tongue, and when, in the middle of the local action, the Korean War blazed up. The account emphasizes, also, the failure of communications between regents and faculty, concluding Chapter 3 with: "The Regents, the President, and the Faculty fell victim to their prior inconsistencies and inabilities to communicate one with another."

Although Tolstoi is not, I think, mentioned anywhere, Gardner suggests a Tolstoian world, where things and mass feeling take charge, while individuals, for all their strugglings, are impotent. Step by step, the president was forced aside, and regents and faculty locked into a combat that neither of them wanted. Often the voting margin was so close that it could be called ridiculous, if it had not been so generally tragic.

One motion in the senate at Los Angeles was carried by 102 to 101. A typical vote of the regents was 12 to 10; once a crucial vote that might have settled the whole matter stood at 10 to 10, with the precedent motion thus confirmed.

The reviewer, who himself passed through the whole affair, feels a limitation upon the method here employed, to present the controversy almost wholly from official documents. It becomes a battle that is seen only from the generals' reports. In reality, it was a soldiers' battle, arising from individuals' beliefs, and maintained by stubborn (some said, pigheaded) will. It was a matter of little meetings in private homes, of quick talks in the hallways, of nightlong mental wrestlings of men caught between expedience and what they believed to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

100 Years of Fighting Stampedes *

THE NATION has managed to survive, the Decatur (Illinois) *Herald* observed on the occasion of our centennial, *"by fighting stampedes for over 100 years."*

Heading off stampedes is peculiarly American; the country has the energy and space to set hoofs really thundering. We call to mind only a few of the most irrational flights: the jingoism that plunged us into wars with Mexico and Spain, the hypocritical hysteria of Prohibition, the "uproar" of McCarthyism, "Let's Get Hoffa!," "Send in the Marines!" (to Haiti, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, etc.), "we must beat the Russians to the moon," the anti-missile missile, the SST. The list is long. Some of the stampedes of the last 102 years ran over us roughshod, some we slowed a bit, some we helped to stop. But there are few we failed to challenge. If you think *Bonanza* is where the action is, come out on the range with *The Nation.*

("Stampede, any headlong flight of a large group; from the Mex.-Sp.* estampida *or 'uproar.'"*)

FREE with each **NEW** subscription

Ralph Nader's

Ralph Nader's articles on auto safety first appeared several years ago in *The Nation.* This is but one example of how *The Nation* raises important issues—before, not after, they become fashionable ones.

UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED

The NATION
333 6th Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10014

Herewith my order and payment for a NEW subscription to *The Nation.* Please send my FREE copy of UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED .

☐ 1 Year, $10 ☐ 2 Years, $18 ☐ 6 Mos., $6

(Foreign and Canadian postage: $1 per year extra)

name .....

address .....

city ..... state ..... zip no. .....

8-19-67

be duty. It was an affair that was f of passion.

The present volume misses all of th and so the essence. Having read it, a being otherwise uninformed, anyo might still be mystified as to what caus the trouble and what it was all about.

In addition, some of Gardner's cc clusions may be challenged, one which may even be considered his ch conclusion, since it is almost a fixatic being stated flatly on page 1, and peated on 7 additional pages. It is th the controversy was not "mostly a cc flict over principles" but that it was "power struggle." This last phrase is, course a present-day cliché. Obvious any kind of struggle involves pow But the actual motive-force of this cc troversy was always the conscientic scruples of a certain number of t faculty. These men and women w not seeking power in any reasonal sense of the word. Yet, without th maintaining a position, the whole cc troversy would simply not have be there.

Neither can I agree with the autho double-pronged final conclusion that t struggle of the nonsigners had been "futile" one which gained a "hollow v tory," and that it resulted in "the trage of their personal lives." To be sure, v tories in this world are likely to be son what hollow, since issues tend to be current. Those who refused to sign loyalty oath, however, were vindica in the courts; the faculty ended, I lieve, by gaining some sense of its o potentiality; the university's next pr dent was a faculty member who h been sympathetic to the nonsigners; his term the regents officially accep tenure.

As for tragedy in the personal li of the nonsigners, I simply fail to it, and I have known most of th through the years, some of them rat intimately. Though they suffered imr diate strain, they never had to end destitution, and after a few years of them who so wished returned to th posts, able to enjoy the sense of hav behaved as they believed their c sciences demanded.

Not theirs was the tragedy, but oth suffered. The ones who said that th would not sign, and then did so (e for the best of motives)—those, an knew some of them, were the tortu ones. Also in the list that might termed tragic were some who as lead had done their best, gone down to feat, and suffered vilification along w frustration.

Although one may thus differ fr Gardner in some respects, one gla grants the excellence of his accur presentation of the record.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THEATRE IN EUROPE 1

HAROLD CLURMAN

London

n *The Male Animal,* the Thurber-Jugent comedy of yesteryear, a college nstructor suspected of "pink" tenden-ies when asked by a suspicious uni-ersity trustee why he had gone to Mos-ow replies that he went to attend a neatre festival. The interrogator snaps ack: "That is a long way to go to see show!"

It is a long way to Berlin and Prague ut, for a theatre person at least, the ffort is well repaid by the pleasure.)ne is reminded of how wide the scope f the theatre may be not only in dra-natic texts but in modes of production.

In my present view of the English :age I won't dwell on the Shakespeare f London and Stratford, where ever nce Peter Hall and his associates of ie Royal Shakespeare Company began roducing the Bard's plays in a non-)mantic manner seeing them once again ecame stimulating. These productions ow constitute a "new wave" in the nglish theatre.

The past London season has by all ccounts been disappointing. The two vents which have been met with un-ualified praise are Laurence Olivier's laying of Strindberg's *The Dance of eath,* and *Rosencrantz and Guilden-ern are Dead* by Tom Stoppard, aged 0.

There can be no doubting the bril-ance of Olivier's wife-bedevilled and ife-tormenting army captain in the wedish play. All previous productions have seen struck me as not so much agic as burdensome. Olivier's perform-nce turns the play into a black comedy. hough I am not at all certain that this what Strindberg had in mind, I am ire it is a most effective way of inter-eting the play for contemporary — articularly English or American — udiences.

Olivier's acting is thoroughly calcu-ted, exact to the last smile, grimace, ep and stance. Every detail registers ith entertaining truthfulness. The ob-rvation is remarkable. We are con-antly kept alert in anticipation of every dded stroke to the picture. And yet, id one almost hesitates to say so, one never moved.

I say "hesitates," not from a reluc-nce to voice the slightest reservation out so justifiably admired a perform-nce, but because one is uncertain hether Olivier expects us to be moved. erhaps he wishes us merely to *observe,* assume an objective and quasi-humor-is attitude toward the torment of the ptain whom his wife hates and whom he in turn loathes, though both are in-dissolubly welded in wedlock. Perhaps we are meant to watch the captain with something like surgical interest as he wriggles, writhes and leaps in matri-monial bondage.

Yes, perhaps so. But I also conjecture whether there is not a point at which Olivier's enormous talent is checked: the point where intelligence, observation, virtuosity and sheer stage magnetism become absorbed in an unforced flow of feeling. The "music" of acting (what Stark Young called "the flower") ap-pears only where the *imitation* of nature ends and the humanity in the actor, stirred by the play's spirit and meaning, takes over and suffuses his being.

There were moments in Olivier's Titus Andronicus when I sensed that this had happened and it is reported that this was also the case with his Coriolanus. I shall not cite *The Entertainer* as an-other example because I saw him in the play on the discouraging second night in New York, but I have come to think of Olivier as a superb actor (than whom there is probably no finer on the English-speaking stage today) but not as a tra-gedian. Tragic acting is as rare today as tragic drama.

Olivier is a magnificent portrait painter, or what is usually called a "character actor," with especially mark-ed gifts in comedy. His Shallow in *Henry IV,* the boozy braggart in Farqu-har's *The Recruiting Officer,* the swishy fop in Sheridan's *The Critic,* the light-brained lecher in Congreve's *Love for Love* are comedy masterpieces beyond cavil. And what charm withal.

The high regard in which Olivier is held should not overshadow the pres-ence on the English stage of many actors of outstanding ability among members of the younger generation. These came into prominence with the emergence of the new English playwrights: Osborne, Pinter, Arden, Wesker. Both actors and playwrights were an expression of an altered social climate. The continuity of excellence from Olivier, Gielgud, Red-grave, Richardson, Guinness, Ashcroft, to the period of Albert Finney, Maggie Smith, Robert Stephens, Joan Plowright, Ian Holm and others composes an im-pressive picture (of which the English are justifiably proud and we envious), and requires special study for America's enlightenment and progress.

English acting is verbally splendid. I do not refer to mere "declamation" but to a sense of language as a dramatic instrument. Voice and speech on the English stage are a positive source of delight. The English actor sounds like a person who belongs on the stage. Then too his physical bearing makes it seem a place of honor. His being an actor is no accident. He is a thorough profes-sional.

All this may be said with only slight complimentary connotations; in fact, I have heard it said in derogation. Such an attitude is stupid and ignorant. For though it is true that one has seen se-rious plays done in London as if they were exercises in diction and many in which there was more artifice than art, the elements in which the English excel are vital to the theatre.

Most of our older actors understood this, but with their disappearance and

RADICAL THEATRE TOUR

SAN FRANCISCO MIME TROUPE
touring Fall-Winter 1967

2 commedia dell'arte plays

". . . an adept troupe, a real ensemble." *N. Y. Times*

Contact: R. G. Davis
S. F. Mime Troupe
924 Howard St.
S. F. 94103
415 GA 1-1984

More CHALLENGING Than Chess!



Now YOU can lead an army! BLITZKRIEG game of "lightning warfare" . . . gives you that opportunity. **YOUR** skill and tactical judgment in commanding land and air troops through well-planned strategic maneuvers determine victory or defeat! By far the largest, most realistic of all battle games, with gigantic terrain map-board. Instructions included for begin-ners, aficionados and game sophisticates. Enjoyable and stimulating challenge for 2 players over age 12. **$6.98**

Available at local game counters, or send $6.98 to **Dept. B-3, Avalon Hill, 4517 Harford Rd., Balto., Md. 21214**

Name_____
Address_____
City_____ State_____ Zip_____
☐ Send FREE brochure Sorry, no C.O.D.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the advent of actors and directors who insisted that acting is not centrally a matter of intelligent speech and social grace in movement, many of our young performers began to think only of "emotion" and "true feeling." This has not infrequently resulted in a special sort of distortion and coarsening. Only a vulgar obscurantism of theatre discussion insists on such alternatives as technique *or* feeling, skill *or* truth.

The English actor tends to a certain formality because his background (the civilization in which he has been reared) is given to formality. Even when he is of working-class origin, as many of the young actors today are, his models impress formal virtues, a manner of cultivated behavior, on the stage aspirant's consciousness. This is rarely true of the American, who must apply himself strenuously to supply what his whole environment so conspicuously lacks. Let us face it: our civilization is becoming increasingly crude. And there are some who regard this as an asset. It is presumed to be more honest. In any case, a certain unvarnished roughness in our arts as well as in our conduct has long been regarded as characteristic.

Apart from the formal felicities of English acting, it often possesses its own tangy savor in low as well as in polite comedy. The English actor also displays a keen eye for oddities and eccentricities of character. (One remembers Wilfred Lawson with affection.) The younger actors have begun to be more susceptible to feeling and have learned to convey it more convincingly than many of their forebears. The emotions which they appear to experience more frequently than others are contempt, frustration, mockery, rage and breakdown.

The crucial difference between English and American acting has less to do with qualities of temperament or natural ability than with other factors. No English actor I have seen possesses greater initial endowment than did John Barrymore, none is more fluent in feeling than Alfred Lunt or more originally inspired than Marlon Brando, Kim Stanley or Maureen Stapleton. And at all times we seem to have been generously provided with wonderful comedians. What is absent among us, more than ever today, is something which urges the English actor to excel in honor as well as in material success or noisy acclaim.

A significant aspect for us to emphasize in an evaluation of Olivier's career is not alone his talent (Alfred Lunt, I have implied, has as much) but the great contribution to the theatre which he has been able to make with his talent. This is not only a matter of artistic integrity or personal ambition but also a response to the pressure of general public and critical demand, which is one of the things meant when we speak of "tradition." This prevailed in England even before the National Theatre and the present Royal Shakespeare Company were founded, but now that they exist they set a standard. Our theatre is in every respect and ever more an anarchy.

At the moment London's "sensational" play is, I repeat, *Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead.* It is a high ly civilized entertainment, and that is n little thing in the theatre today.

A comedy, it is gratifyingly literat frequently witty and altogether inte ligent. It also evinces a particular kin of originality. Its author has taken th plot of *Hamlet* and looked at it throug the eyes of the two paltry puppets ir vited to spy at the maleficent court c Elsinore. The point of the play is tha Hamlet's university companions hav only the faintest notion as to the natur or meaning of the tragedy in which the are constrained to enact the most haj less roles. They are entirely ignorant a to what is involved. Perhaps the funnie line of the play is the one in whic Rosencrantz itemizes the facts of Ham let's situation (his father's death, h failure to succeed to the throne, h mother's sudden marriage to his uncl and then asks in effect "What in th world can be troubling him?"

The play aspires to something mo than a comedic commentary on th classic. Rosencrantz and Guildenster are ordinary men in the sense that th two vagrants of *Waiting for Godot* ar Like them, Rosencrantz and Guilden stern are at a loss about the world int which they have been summoned. Wh is really demanded of them? Why ar they trapped in a maze and turmo which is accidental, meaningless an finally murderous?

In brief, the play is a comedy parab of unheroic man's (the bulk of humar ity's) position in the universe, the di astrous puzzlement of life. On this lev I regard it as a wise joke only, a brigl intellectual charade. But who excep suddenly stimulated reviewers overcom by the theatre's mediocrity will claim a exalted stature for the play or be vexe with me for not allowing that it achieve the heights of comedy? We ought to b glad that a gifted new playwright ha appeared on the English stage and ha made his debut with something bette than another clever show.

(To be continued)

RESPONSES

leaving the bird house
central park zoo
a small boy asks ***me***
mister
did you kill
all the birds?
i offer him a plastic
crackerjack prize
i ask do you know
what that is?
yes he says
what is it?

ROBERT HERSHON

AGENTS WANTED

CHRISTMAS CARDS—Business and Personal. Customer's name imprinted. Earn unusually high commissions from this medium- and high-priced line. No investment. No inventory. Free Sample Album. **Process Corp. (our 46th year), 3440A S. 54th Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60650.**

PERSONALS

SALASACAN WALL-HANGINGS—Tapestries, hand-woven by the Salasacan Indians of the Andes. Moderately priced (C.D. Project). Write: **ANDEAN, Box 2948, Quito, Ecuador.**

NON-PROFIT CAMP (interracial, interreligious) desperately needs donation of pianos. **Tax deductible.** Will pick up. **Box 600, c/o The Nation.**

STUDENT at Music & Art High School needs summer employment. Willing and able. **Box 601, c/o The Nation.**

SHORT PLAYS, SONGS and WRITERS needed immediately in National Theater for Peace. No play? Send money! **Committee of the Professions, 250 West 57 Street, N.Y.C. 10019.**

The Nation
SUBSCRIBERS' BOOK SERVICE

Offers the following at discount prices:

	Price
☐ HELL'S ANGELS: A Strange and Terrible Saga by Hunter Thompson (Random House, $4.95)	$3.95
☐ THE ACCIDENTAL PRESIDENT by Robert Sherrill (Grossman, $5.00)	$4.00
☐ THE FREE WORLD COLOSSUS: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War by David Horowitz (Hill and Wang, $6.95)	$5.55
☐ FRIENDSHIP AND FRATRICIDE: An Analysis of Whittaker Chambers and Alger Hiss by Dr. Meyer A. Zeligs (Viking, $8.95)	$7.15
☐ DE GAULLE: A Political Biography by Alexander Werth (Simon and Schuster, $7.50)	$6.00
☐ THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POWER by Ronald Sampson (Pantheon, $4.95)	$3.96

Remittance accompanying orders should be made payable to THE NATION, 333 6th Ave., N.Y. 10014

☐ **Payment enclosed** ☐ **Please bill me**

Readers can avail themselves of our regular offer to send them any book (except paperbacks), published in the U.S. at the retail price post-free. When ordering, please give title, author and publisher, if possible.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED